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The Proposed Permanent International
Criminal Court: An Appraisal
Leila Sadat Wexler*
Introduction
The twentieth century has been plagued by wars, human rights abuses, and
terrorism. Much of this activity falls under the rubric of international
crime. Yet, although hundreds of treaties attempting to address these
problems have been signed, their enforcement has been practically nonex-
istent. Indeed, it is unclear what conduct many of the instruments entered
into actually cover. Crimes are undefined or poorly defined in some and
others appear to proscribe without actually criminalizing particular behav-
ior. No international criminal justice system exists to interpret and enforce
international criminal law, and national criminal justice systems often lack
either the authority or the political power to step in. Indeed, where the
government itself is engaging in criminal behavior, national criminal jus-
tice systems are often part of the problem.
The case for a permanent international criminal court with jurisdic-
tion over serious violations of international criminal law is therefore, as
will be shown below,1 a compelling one.2 Legal accountability, if consist-
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis and Chair of the
International Law Association (American Branch) Committee on a Permanent
International Criminal Court. This article was adapted from a presentation given at
Cornell Law School in March, 1996. The author would like to thank her colleagues
Susan F. Appleton, Kathleen F. Brickey, Gray L. Dorsey, William C. Jones, Stephen H.
Legomsky, Ronald M. Levin, Ronald Mann and A. Peter Mutharika for their helpful
comments, the members of the International Law Association (American Branch)
Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court for sharing their insights and
knowledge of the subject, David Wippman for the opportunity to present this paper,
Mario Loyola and Rachel Storch for their extraordinary research support, Beverly Owens
for her fine secretarial assistance and Paul and Samuel Wexler for their understanding
and inspiration.
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. For expressions of similar views, see Bienvenido C. Ambion, Organization of a
Court of International CriminalJurisdiction, 29 PHILIPPINE LJ. 345 (1950); Bienvenido C.
Ambion, Establishment of the Proposed International Criminal Court, 30 PHiUPiNE L. J.
370 (1955); M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and
Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HoFsTrA L. Rav. 523 (1981); M. Cherif Bas-
siouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the
New World Order, 25 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time
Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IN. Irr'TL & COMP. L. REv. 1 (1991);
Louis Ren6 Beres, After the Gulf War: Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Under the Rule of Law, 24
VAN. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1991); William N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the
Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FoRDHAm INT'L L. J. 88 (1992-93); Matthew
Lippman, Towards an International Criminal Court, 3 SAN DIEGO Jus-r. J. 1 (1995); Paul
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ently enforced, would surely bring about much of the good on an interna-
tional scale that it does domestically, in terms of deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of the victims of crime, retribution for the criminal act, and
upholding of the principles of justice and law. Moreover, the creation of
the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 3 and Rwanda4 sug-
gests that there is a political consensus on creating an international crimi-
nal court that was not previously present.5 At the very least, it indicates a
relative openness of mind that is new.6
D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal
Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (1995); JohnJ. Parker, An International Criminal
Court: The Case for its Adoption, 38 A.B.A. J. 641 (1952); Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an
International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J. I'rr'L L. 37 (1950). See also International Law
Association (American Branch) Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court,
First Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and .Complementarity, Decem-
ber 27, 1996, 13 Nouvau.s ETUDES PENALES 159 (1997) (Leila Sadat Wexler, Reporter)
[hereinafter I.L.A. First Committee Report]; BENJAMIN FERENcZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CwIMi-
NAL COURT: A Sm= TowAR WORLD PEACE (1980). For an expression of opposing views,
see Christopher L Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribu-
nal, 18 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 77 (1992); George A. Finch, An International Crimi-
nal Court: The Case Against Its Adoption, 38 A.B.A. J. 644 (1952); Alfred P. Rubin, An
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 7 (1994).
3. Established by S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808
(1993). Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808, the Secretary-General prepared a
report containing comments on the articles of the statute of the tribunal. The tribunal's
statute appears in an Annex to the Secretary-General's report. Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704/
Add.i/Corr.1 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General]. The Security Council
adopted the Secretary-General's draft of the statute without change in Resolution 827.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]. For a fine analysis of the ICTY's constitution and work thus far, see M. CHERIF
BAssioun & PETER MANiKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOS.AVIA (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
4. Established by Security Council Resolution 955. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
5. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has had problems
implementing its mandate due to the lack of cooperation by some States, according to
Tribunal President Antonio Cassese. United Nations Press Release, GA/9166, Novem-
ber 19, 1996. The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) will not be
discussed in detail. However, references to their statutes, creation and operation will be
made where relevant As one commentator recently noted, almost all the features of the
ICTR and ICTY concerning the election of judges, the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and
the requirements of State cooperation are unlike the provisions of the proposed perma-
nent International Criminal Court. Colin Warbrick, The United Nations System: A Place
for Criminal Courts?, 5 T-ANSNAT'L L. & COrTEMP. PROBS. 237, 246 (1995). Thus, details
of the ad hoc Tribunals' Statutes, while interesting, only indirectly inform our under-
standing of the permanent international criminal court. Id. at 260-61.
6. "For the first time since the Second World War, a variety of factors have con-
verged creating a rare opportunity to augment the international legal structure and
advance the rule of law by establishing a permanent international criminal court." MoR.
Ris & SCHARF, supra note 3, at 354.
Political support for the creation of the Court, at least in some countries, has been
growing recently. The creation of an international criminal court was endorsed by Presi-
dent Clinton in October 1995 and again in January of this year. Peter Baker, Clinton
Renews Call for Standing War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. Posr, Jan. 30, 1997. More
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In 1995, the U.N. General Assembly established a committee (the
"Preparatory Committee") to consider the Draft Statute for a permanent
international criminal court adopted by the International Law Commission
(ILC) in 1994.7 The Preparatory Committee, open to all members of the
United Nations as well as members of specialized agencies, was charged
with "preparing a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for
an international criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a
conference of plenipotentiaries."8 The Preparatory Committee concluded
its first two sessions in 1996,9 and its mandate was renewed by the General
Assembly at the end of the year.10 The Preparatory Committee recently
concluded its third session and will continue its work over the next year
recently, The New York Times and former President Jimmy Carter expressed their sup-
port. See An Effective Global Court, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 28, 1996. But see Timothy C.
Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and American Concerns, 6
PACE INT'L L. RTv. 121, 157 (1994) (arguing that the position of the U.S., at least in
1994, was "cautious and indifferent").
Some countries, of course, remain deeply opposed to its establishment, or at least to
its establishment on the terms envisaged by the 1994 ILC draft. Those objecting to the
Court's establishment argue that if the Court is unsuccessful its ineffectiveness will
undermine the international legal order its creation seeks to bolster. See, e.g., Christo-
pher L. Blakesley, Report to the International Law Association Committee on a Permanent
International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and Triggering Mechanism,
13 NouvELLEs t-UDES PENALES 177 (1997); Robert B. Ely, III, A Proposal for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court; A Critique and an Alternative, 57 DIcK. L. REv. 46, 56 (1952).
Unlike civil courts, criminal courts cannot function effectively without the sup-
port of police forces and executioners of their own.... [1]f [the proposed Court]
were obliged to rely on national forces... [it] could not discharge its functions
effectively except in the case of nonentities whose efforts were too obscure to be
of any public interest, and whose trial might well be left to national courts.
Id. Rubin, supra note 2. These arguments are taken up again in Part III below.
7. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Draft Statute].
8. U.N. GAOR 50/46, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995). The Preparatory
Committee was also instructed to consider "the major substantive and administrative
issues arising out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission
and, taking into account the different views expressed during the meetings, to draft
texts" so as to accomplish its mission. Id. The resolution establishing the Preparatory
Committee also decided that the General Assembly would study the report of the Pre-
paratory Committee, and "in light of that report... decide on the convening of an
international conference of plenipotentiaries to finalize and adopt a convention on the
establishment of an international criminal court." Id.
9. The first session was held from March 25 to April 12, 1996. The second session
was held from August 12 to August 30, 1996. Both sessions were held at the UN Head-
quarters in New York. The proceedings are summarized in two reports: Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.249/1 (1996) [hereinafter Preparatory Committee Summary, First Session],
and Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court, Vol. I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August
1996) & Vol. II (Compilation of Proposals), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, U.N.
Doc. A/51/22 (1996). For a fine analysis of the 1996 Preparatory Committee sessions
urging the Committee to go beyond open-ended working meetings and towards a "posi-
tive and genuine drafting effort," see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the
1997-1998 Preparatory Committee, 13 NoUVELEs trTUtES PENALES 5, 12 (1997).
10. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/51/627, adopted Dec. 17, 1996.
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and a half, leading up to a diplomatic conference which is now scheduled
for 1998.11 It is hoped that the Court will be operational before the turn of
the century. 12
Although the 1994 ILC Draft has often been criticized, a careful study
reveals a thoughtful and reasonable outline of what the structure of the
proposed Court might look like. The Commission's draft also embodies
certain structural flaws, however, which, if "enacted" by States, could pre-
vent the Court from carrying out its intended role. The draft statute denies
the Court the permanence and stability needed to develop institutional
memory and competence; 13 subjects its jurisdiction, in all cases except for
genocide, to a regime of State consent that could cripple the Court com-
pletely;14 fails to provide for its financing; and, perhaps most egregiously,
subjects the Court in large measure to the will of the Security Council. In
the words of one author, "when the theoretical clutter is stripped away and
realistic probability is considered, the court may never have occasion to
deal with any cases except upon affirmative action by the Security Coun-
cil." 15 Finally, in trying to satisfy many different constituencies by grant-
ing the Court a subject matter jurisdiction which is unrealistically broad,
the proposed statute may end up satisfying no one. 16
Yet the ILC's Draft clearly provides the template upon which any inter-
national criminal court, if created, will be modelled. Its detailed study is
therefore required, and not just as an academic exercise. American input
and support are vital not only for the success of the endeavor but, more
generally, to ensure the United States' adherence to an international institu-
tion the consequences of which have been thoroughly explored and
understood.
This article examines previous efforts to establish a permanent inter-
national criminal court and why they failed. It then analyzes the proposed
Court's structure, jurisdiction and intended role in the enforcement of
international criminal law.17 The proposed statute will be assessed in light
11. Id. See also Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court Concludes
Third Session, United Nations Press Release, L/2824, Feb. 21, 1997.
12. Proposed International Criminal Court Should be Operational Before Turn of Cen-
tury, Preparatory Committee Told, United Nations Press Release, L/2809, Aug. 27, 1996.
This statement by the French delegation may be too optimistic, however. The Prepara-
tory Committee ended its second session by concluding that it would continue its dis-
cussions on the draft statute of the proposed court with a view to finalizing the text by
the end of April 1998, and holding a diplomatic conference later that year. Preparatory
Committee for International Criminal Court Concludes Second Session, United Nations
Press Release, L/2813, Aug. 30, 1996. This was confirmed by the General Assembly on
December 17. 1996. It had previously been hoped that the conference could take place
in 1997.
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
14. See discussion infra Parts II.D.1-4, III.B.4.
15. Daniel H. Derby, An International Criminal Court for the Future, 5 TRANSNAT'L
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 307, 311 (1995).
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. Other analyses of the Draft Statute with somewhat different foci can be found in
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: Suggested Modifications to the 1994 ILC
Draft Prepared by a Committee of Experts, Done in Siracusa/Freiburg/Chicago, January
Vol. 29
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of objections to the creation of an international crimifial court that have
been raised over time and explores the relative advantages of a permanent
Court over trial by ad hoc tribunals or national courts.18 I conclude that if
the problems raised by the ILC's draft can be remedied, there is reason to
believe that the proposed Court will function well, both as a forum for the
trial of war criminals and as an institution capable of constructing a frame-
work for the establishment of justice and the international rule of law.19
I. History
A. Efforts to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court Prior
to the Second World War
At the end of World War I, the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties20 proposed the
constitution of an international "high tribunal" for the trial of "all enemy
persons alleged to have been guilty of offences against the laws and cus-
toms of war and the laws of humanity."21 The American members of the
Commission objected. First, they noted that they knew of "no international
statute or convention making a violation of the laws and customs of war-
not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity22-an international
crime affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has juris-
31, 1996 (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter Siracusa Draft]; 1994 ILC Draft Stat-
ute for an International Criminal Court With Suggested Modifications (Updated Siracusa-
Draft) prepared by a Committee of Experts, Done in Siracusa/ Frieburg/ Chicago, March
15, 1996 [hereinafter Updated Siracusa Draft]; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter UN Ad Hoc Committee Report].
18. To a large degree, this article focuses on the judicial aspects of the proposed
Court. Its prosecutorial aspects will be discussed from time to time as well. For an
explanation of the term "Court" as used in the Draft Statute, see infra note 126.
19. As Cherif Bassiouni recently wrote, "[i]nstitutions live and evolve through those
who lead them." BAssIouN & MANIKAs, supra note 3, at xvii. The European Court of
Justice with a charter that is inordinately short, has accomplished more than any of its
founders could have imagined. It has fashioned a "constitutional framework" for the
European Union from the laconic command of article 164 of the EC Treaty that it
"ensure in the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty the law is observed." Leila
Sadat Wexler, The Role of the European Court of Justice on the Way to European Union, in
EUROPE AFrER MAAsrmcirr: AMERIcAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 159, 164 (Paul Michael
Lfitzler ed., 1994). There is no reason to believe the permanent international criminal
court could not be equally successful: many of the problems that the International
Court of Justice has experienced could be avoided by careful planning.
20. The Commission was established at the plenary session of the Preliminary Peace
Conference in 1919. U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL, HIsTo~icAL SURVEY OF THE QUES-nON OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURIsDICTON, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
V.8 (1949) [hereinafter U.N. HIS-oRICAL SURvEY].
21. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties: Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 14 AM.J. INT'L L. 95, 123
(1920).
22. The Americans particularly objected to the term "laws of humanity." See Leila
Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassa-
tion: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 CoLuM. L. REV. 289, 299 (1994) [herein-
after Wexler, Nuremberg Principles].
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diction over the offence."23 Second, they argued that the proposed trials
would violate the principle of sovereignty, particularly as to the attempt to
impose international criminal liability on a Head of State.
24
A compromise resulted and articles 227, 228 and 229 of the Treaty of
Versailles provided for a "special tribunal" that would try William II of
Hohenzollern, the German Emperor, for the "supreme offence against inter-
national morality and the sanctity of treaties."25 The trial never occurred,
however, for the Netherlands refused to extradite William 11.26 Indeed, the
whole affair was generally considered a fiasco.
Following this attempt to establish an international criminal tribunal,
proposals for the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court issued from many quarters. None were successful. The Advisory
Committee of Jurists of the League of Nations submitted a Resolution
(Voeu) that a High Court of International Justice be established, composed
of one member for each State, which would be "competent to try crimes
constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal
law of nations, referred to it by the Assembly or by the Council of the
League of Nations."27 The Resolution was ultimately ignored. 28
The International Law Association (I.L.A.) adopted a statute for an
23. U.N. HSOiucAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 58.
24. Heads of State might be morally "responsible to mankind" but, in the American
view, had no such legal responsibility. Legally, a Head of State exercises sovereign
rights conferred upon him by his people. As their agent, it is to them alone to whom he
must answer in law. Id. at 59-60.
25. Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, art. 227, 2 Bevans 43, 136,
reprinted in 11 Martens Nouveau Receuil (Ser. 3) 323 (Fr.) [hereinafter Treaty of Ver-
sailles]. The Tribunal was to be international in character, being composed of five
judges appointed, one each, by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy andJapan,
respectively. Id.
26. See Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg: Forty-five Years Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,
10 (1991). Similarly, although articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty provided for the sur-
render by Germany of other accused persons for trial either by national military tribu-
nals or by military tribunals composed of members from more than one Allied power, in
the case of "criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers." Treaty of Versailles, supra note 25, art. 229, very few trials were held.
The few Germans accused of war crimes were tried by the German Supreme Court in
Leipzig. Lippman, supra, at 10-11. See also Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22,
at 300.
27. Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Comm. of Jurists on the Perma-
nent Court of Int'lJustice, League of Nations-Legal 1920 I, Vol. 1, at 503 (1920). For a
discussion of the voeu and its fate in the League of Nations, see Lord Phillimore, An
International Criminal Court and the Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists, 1922-23 BmIT.
Y.B. IN'r'L L. 79; Manley 0. Hudson, The Proposed International Criminal Court, 32 Am. J.
INT'L L. 549, 550 (1938).
28. The Resolution was studied by the Third Committee of the Assembly who
rejected it on the grounds that "there is not yet any international penal law recognized by
all nations, and that, if it were possible to refer [certain to any jurisdiction], it would be
more practical to establish a special chamber in the Court of International Justice." U.N.
HISrORicA SURvEY, supra note 20, at 11 (quoting the Third Comm. of the First Assembly
of the League of Nations). The idea was ultimately ignored by the Assembly, who evi-
dently agreed with the Third Committee that consideration of the problem was "prema-
ture." Id. at 11-12.
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international criminal court in 1926,29 as did the International Association
of Penal Law in 1928.30 Both drafts envisaged that the court would be a
division of the Permanent Court of International Justice and both proposed
the trial of States as well as individuals. 3 1 Neither draft was officially
considered.3 2
First, the question of sovereignty was still omnipresent. For example,
in discussing the I.L.A.'s proposed statute, many members of the Associa-
tion found the idea of an international court trying and sentencing individ-
uals simply incompatible with the "present scheme of International Law
[which is] based on the conception that it governs the relations between
States."33 With its capacity to arraign individuals, the proposed court was
thus an affront to the sovereignty of the State.34 Closely related to objec-
tions concerning national sovereignty was a proposed "right" to be judged
according to domestic law and by one's countrymen. 35
Second, critics pointed to the absence of positive law with which
29. The Association adopted a resolution in 1924 providing that "in [its] ... opinion
... the creation of an International Criminal Court is essential in the interests of justice,
and.., a matter of urgency," several objections were raised. INTERNATIONAL LAW Associ-
ATION, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-THRD CONFERNCE 92 (1925) [hereinafter 1924 I.L.A.
REPORT]. The I.L.A. adopted a draft statute in 1926. INTERNATIONAL LAw Assoc.TION,
REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FouRTH CONFERENCE (1927) [hereinafter 1926 I.L.A. REPORT].
30. U.N. HisTolucAI SURVEy, supra note 20, at 15. An English translation of the draft
statute prepared by Professor V. V. Pella, as adopted by the International Association for
Penal Law in 1928, and subsequently revised in 1946 to account for the supersession of
the Permanent Court of international Justice and the League of Nations by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the United Nations may also be found. See id. at 75-88.
31. 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, arts. 21, 22, 24 (Statute of the Court); Interna-
tional Association for Penal Law Draft Statute arts. 35, 36 (1946).
32. The idea was revived after the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in
1934, and in 1937 a convention was opened for signature on the creation of an interna-
tional criminal court that would try persons accused of an offence established in the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Because the proposed
court's subject matter jurisdiction was so limited, and relatively well-defined, it avoided
many of the objections raised to earlier proposals. Nevertheless, the convention was only
signed by thirteen nations, and never entered into force. Convention for the Creation of
an International Criminal Court, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1937, LEAGUE OF NATIONS
OJ. Spec. Supp. 156 (1938); League of Nations Doc. C.547(1)M.384(1)1937V (never
entered into force), reprinted in 7 INTERATIONAL LEGISLATION (1935-1937), at 878 (Man-
ley 0. Hudson ed., 1941). See also Hudson, supra note 27; U.N. HISTOICAL SURVEY,
supra note 20, at 16.
33. 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 163 (comment by Dr. Ludwik Ehrlich).
34. See the comments of Mr. John Hinkley (USA) (there can be no international
criminal law because there is no international sovereign power), 1924 I.L.A. REPORT,
supra note 29, at 107-08.
35. In the words of one member: "[Ilt usurps the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Courts, and deprives the citizen of the right to be tried by his own Courts, his own laws,
and his own countrymen." 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 153 (comments of Sir
Graham Bower). Responding to this claim, Judge Fitzgerald stated that "English subjects
to-day who live abroad, all the world over, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of
the country in which they live." Id. at 174. Even Judge Fitzgerald, however, found it
"obvious" that "Europeans could not be left to be dealt with by Oriental Courts" in
countries such as China, Egypt and parts of Morocco. Id.
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potential defendants could be charged.3 6 At the 1926 meeting of the Inter-
national Law Association, for example, the question was starkly put:
"Faut-il avoir la Cour avant la Loi, ou la Loi avant la Cour?"37 That is, must
an international criminal code be adopted prior to the establishment of an
international criminal court?3 8
Third, not all agreed that an international criminal court could help to
prevent war, the premise upon which the Court's establishment was based.
Of course, no one seriously suggested that the proposed court alone could
prevent war. Rather, it was hoped that the Court could contribute to that
goal.39 But some contended that a Court might actually exacerbate inter-
national relations:
This Court would render a peace impossible. When the soldiers and sailors
had finished fighting, when hostilities were over and the soldiers and sailors
on both sides were ready to shake hands with one another, as they are to-
day, the lawyers would begin a war of accusation and counter accusation
and recrimination. Such a war would render a peace of reconciliation
impossible.4 °
B. The Nuremberg Legacy
The atrocities of the Second World War, like those of World War I, again
inspired interest in the establishment of a permanent international crimi-
nal court that might prevent such offenses and punish the offenders. 4 1
Upon winning the war, the victors decided to try the Axis leaders rather
36. The statute as originally proposed by Dr. Bellot gave the proposed Court juris-
diction not only over war crimes (either generally accepted as binding or contained in
treaties in force between the States of which the complainants and defendants were sub-
jects or citizens), but also over "all offenses committed contrary to the laws of humanity
and the dictates of public conscience." 1924 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, Draft Statute
for the Permanent International Criminal Court, art. 25, at 81. An American member
objected, stating that this was simply "too vague and indefinite to be the guide of any
Court, no matter how constituted." Id. at 102 (comment by the Hon. Charles Henry
Butler).
37. "Must one have the Court before the law, or the law before the Court?" 1926
I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 182.
38. Thinking that the Court would function more as a common law court than a
continental court, a majority of the members did not think the code need precede the
court. See, e.g., 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 179-80 (comments of Dr. Emil de
Nagy, M.P. (Hungary)). Nevertheless, this idea troubled many members of the Associa-
tion, and continues to concern many who might otherwise feel comfortable with the
creation of an international criminal court. See infra Part III.A.5.
39. See, e.g., 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 175 (remarks ofJudge Fitzgerald).
40. Id. at 154 (remarks of Sir Graham Bower). To this, one member retorted that
"the honorable gentleman seems to forget that behind the shake hands [sic] there are
millions of mourning widows and crying orphans." Id. at 178.
41. A variety of proposals, some more definite than others, were issued during this
time. For example, Hans Kelsen proposed the punishment of war criminals by an inter-
national criminal tribunal, HANs KEasEN, PEACE THROUGH LAw 110-24 (1973), and the
International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development issued a report
(but no definite proposal) discussing the possibility of establishing an international
criminal court, U.N. HIsTomcAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 19-20. The United Nations
War Crimes Commission, established by a conference of the Allied Governments to
investigate war crimes, drafted a convention for the establishment of a United Nations
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than shoot them. The Allies had announced their intentions in the Declara-
tion of St. James4 2 in 1942 and at Moscow in 1943, 43 but the decision to
hold a trial was not a foregone conclusion. As Justice Jackson stated to the
Nuremberg Tribunal in his opening statement: "That four great nations,
flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and
voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one
of the most significant tributes that Power ever has paid to Reason."44
So much has been written about the trials at Nuremberg45 that only a
brief summary, relevant to our discussion here, will follow. 4 6 The Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was constituted by an intema-
war crimes court to try war criminals. Id. See also TELFo D TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS 26 (1992).
One of the more detailed statutes was the proposal of the London International
Assembly established in 1941 under the auspices of the League of Nations, see U.N.
HISTORICAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 18-19, which drafted a 62-article statute establish-
ing an International Criminal Court as an organ of the United Nations. Like the current
proposal for an International Criminal Court, the Court proposed by the Assembly
would have heard only cases in which "no domestic court of any one of the United
Nations has jurisdiction to try the accused and . .. [is] in a position and willing to
exercise such jurisdiction." Id. at 97. The Court would have had jurisdiction only over
war crimes, fairly loosely defined. Id. art. 2. Interestingly, the statute provided for an
international constabulary charged with the "execution of the orders of the Court and of
the Procurator General [of the Court]." Id. art. 25.
42. Resolution by Allied Governments Condemning German Terror and Demanding
Retribution (Jan. 13, 1942), reprinted in 144 BRITISH AND FOREIGN PAPERS 1940-1942, at
1072-74 (1952).
43. Declaration of German Atrocities, Nov. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 816 [hereinafter Mos-
cow Declaration].
44. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE 31 (1971).
45. See, e.g., Richard Falk, Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The
Impact of the War Crimes Trials on International Law, Remarks Before the American Society
of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 80TH ANNUAL MEETING 65 (1986); Hans Kelsen,
Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in International Law?, 1
INT'L L.Q. 164, 165 (1947); Lippman, supra note 26, at 20; Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INr'L L. 178, 179-83 (1946); M. CHERIF BASsioUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HumANrIY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 211-12 (1992); TAYLOR, supra note
41; THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ginsburgs & Kurdriavtsev eds.,
1990).
46. Although not the first international criminal tribunal in history, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials are certainly the first relevant precedents of our time. Because much
less weight is generally accorded to the judgments issued by the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East than to the Nuremberg precedent for a variety of reasons,
including the perception that the Tokyo proceedings were substantially unfair to many
of the defendants, it will not be discussed further here. Unlike the IMT at Nuremberg
which was established by an international treaty, the IMTFE was established by a special
proclamation issued by General MacArthur, employing his authority as Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers. DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 10, 1996, at 361, as amended, DEP'T
ST. BULL., May 26, 1996, at 890. In the Proclamation, MacArthur set out the tribunal's
jurisdiction and substantive law (which paralleled, but was not identical to the Nurem-
berg Tribunal's). The Charter gave MacArthur power to appoint the judges (art. 2) as
well as the President of the Tribunal (art. 3(a)), who had a deciding vote in the case of a
tie (art. 4(b)). In addition, MacArthur appointed the Chief of Counsel (art. 8(a)) who
was responsible for the prosecution of the trials. None of the defendants indicted by the
IMFTE were acquitted. On the Tokyo trials, see generally BASSiOUNI, supra note 45, at
211-12.
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tional agreement 47 signed by the four Allied powers on August 8, 1945.48
Known as the London Accord, the agreement stated the Allies' intention to
try "war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location,
whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of
organizations or groups or in both capacities." 49
Annexed to the London Accord was the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal. 50 The thirteen short articles of the Charter addressed
the Tribunal's composition, rules of procedure and jurisdiction-they also
defined, in somewhat summary fashion, the law to be applied.51 Pursuant
to article 6, the Nazis would be arraigned on three charges: crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.52 The Charter also pro-
vided that the defendants were individually responsible for the commis-
sion of such crimes, notwithstanding their positions as heads of state or
the fact that a defendant may have acted pursuant to an order of his Gov-
ernment or of a superior.' 3
47. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, August 8, 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257
(Supp. 1945) [hereinafter London Accord].
48. The Agreement was originally signed by the United States, the Provisional Gov-
ernment of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. Subsequently, 19 other nations signed it, as well. SEcRETARY GENERAL, THE
CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NoREMBERG TRIBUNAL at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, U.N.
Sales No. 1949.V.7 (1949) [hereinafter SEcRETARY GENERAL's MEMORANDUM].
49. London Accord, supra note 47, art. 1. The Accord also bound the signatories to
make potential defendants available to the Tribunal, id., art. 3, and specified that the
proceedings before the IMT would be without prejudice to the powers of national courts
to try war criminals within their jurisdiction and without prejudice to the decision of the
Allies that war criminals (other than the major war criminals indictable under the IMT
Charter) would be sent back to the countries in which their crimes were committed for
trial. Id. art. 4. Article 4 refers to the Moscow Declaration of 1943, supra note 43, in
which the Allies formally declared their intention to prosecute German war criminals.
50. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, August 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 Am.J. Irr'L L. 258 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter IMT Charter].
51. The tribunal had four judges, one from each signatory country. The judges
elected their President, IMT Charter, supra note 50, arts. 2, 4(b), unless a session of the
tribunal was to occur on the territory of one of the four Signatories, in which case the
representative of that Signatory on the Tribunal would serve as President. Id. art. 4(b).
The judges were to fashion their own rules of procedure, id. art. 13., and were specifi-
cally authorized to try a defendant in absentia if the defendant could not be found or if it
was, in the judgment of the tribunal, "necessary, in the interests ofjustice, to conduct the
hearing in his absence." Id. art. 12. No provisions for appeal, pardon or mercy were
contained in the Charter, and no provisions for the protection of the accused.
52. IMT Charter, supra note 50, art. 6. These three categories have, in spite of their
imperfections, remained the classification upon which most subsequent international
criminal law instruments have been based.
53. IMT Charter, supra note 50, art. 8. Somewhat controversially, the Charter also
permitted the Tribunal to rule upon the criminality of organizations or groups, and pro-
vided that such a determination by the IMT would be binding in any subsequent pro-
ceeding brought by or before the national court of a signatory state. Id. art. 10. Finally,
in a provision that has given rise to much debate, the Charter stated that "Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices" who had participated in the "formulation or
execution or a common plan of conspiracy" to commit any of the three crimes were
"responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan." Id. art. 6.
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Of the twenty-two individual defendants tried by the IMT, nineteen
were found guilty and three were acquitted.54 Although the trials were gen-
erally considered to have been conducted in a manner that was fair to the
defendants (suggesting that international criminal trials need not be inher-
ently unfair nor impossible to conduct in a manner satisfactory to jurists
from diverse legal systems),55 some argued that the IMT Charter and Judg-
ment was but a (retroactive) droit ad hoc,5 6 in which only the vanquished
were tried by judges representing the nationalities of the victors.57 Indeed,
there is little doubt that the Charter was drafted quickly and under political
constraints. 58 Nor was the Tribunal free from the political and psychologi-
cal stress of the war.5 9
Notwithstanding, as Justice Jackson pointed out in his final report to
President Truman, in October 1946, the Charter was finally adopted by 23
nations who agreed for the first time explicitly, that "to prepare, incite, or
54. Judgment of October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sen-
tence, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172, 333 (1947) [hereinafter IMT Judgment].
55. See, e.g., BAssIoUmN, supra note 45, at 4, 11-12.
56. CLAUDE LOMBOIS, DRorr PEALu. INTERNA-ToNAL 157 (1979). The defense also
argued that the prosecution was ex post facto and that it conflicted with the principle of
legality since no statute specifically proscribed the defendants' conduct or set out a
punishment. The Tribunal rejected both contentions. IMT Judgment, supra note 54, at
216. See also Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22, at 307 n.62. With respect to
crimes against peace and war crimes, the Tribunal could at least cite various treaties that
Germany had signed and arguably violated, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Convention of 1929. With
respect to crimes against humanity, however, the Tribunal was on shakier ground, being
able to point to no international instruments specifically condemning the defendant's
behavior. Some commentators have suggested that this violated the prohibition on retro-
active prosecutions. Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22, at 307. Even with
respect to crimes where some international instrument existed, however, the defendants
could still argue, as they did, for example with respect to the application of the Kellogg-
Briand pact to their conduct, that the international instrument in question did not spe-
cifically criminalize their behavior. Thus, the Tribunal's decision is often criticized
either because specific prescriptive norms were lacking (as in the case of crimes against
humanity), or because the prescriptive international norms that existed were not associ-
ated with criminal sanctions (as in the case of crimes against peace and war crimes), or
both. Whether one accepts the Tribunal's response or not probably depends upon one's
"choice of an underlying theory of legal philosophy." BAssiouNP, supra note 45, at 528.
57. It is a fair point that none of the victors were tried for war crimes at Nuremberg,
although that fact alone cannot exculpate the Nazis for their crimes. Certainly, I would
not agree that one has a fundamental right, as Sir Graham Bower argued, to a judge of
one's own nationality. 1926 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 29, at 153-54. The 1994 Draft
Statute provides that the judges should have neither the defendant's nor the accused's
nationality, which is probably the proper solution. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art.
9(7).
58. See, e.g., BAssiouNi, supra note 45, at 11.
59. Id. at 18. Adherence to legal roles of substance and procedure in cases involving
atrocities may appear to make a mockery ofjustice: "lafroide procedure contre le souvenir
de l'horreur." ("Cold [legal] procedure versus the memory of horror.") Marie-France
Etchegoin, Au procs Touvier, d Versailles: les ficelles de l'avocat du diable, NoUvE.
OBSERVATEUR, Mar. 24-30, 1994, at 86. For an elaboration of this problem, see Leila
Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against
Humanity in France, 20 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 191 (1995) [hereinafter Wexler,
Reflections].
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wage a war of aggression, or to conspire with others to do so, is a crime
against international society, and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence
to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious grounds in con-
nection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian popu-
lations, is an international crime, and that for the commission of such
crimes individuals are responsible."60 Thus the Charter seemed to lay to
rest, at least as a practical matter, the theory that the constitution of an
international criminal tribunal contravenes the sovereignty of states per
se.61
Finally, having embodied its judgment in a legal precedent, 62 the Tri-
bunal arguably created the positive law thought to be lacking prior to its
existence, although some would argue otherwise. At the very least, if
Nuremberg left us with a cloudy legal legacy, its moral force is clear: freed
from its original limitations, the Nuremberg judgment affirms the idea that
war as a means of solving inter-state conflict is morally, legally, and politi-
cally wrong.63
C. United Nations' Efforts to Establish an International Criminal Court
Following the Second World War
Nuremberg helped overcome objections to an international criminal court
on the basis of sovereignty. 64 In addition, over the next 50 years, interna-
tional criminal "positive law" would develop in the form of a variety of legal
instruments enacted as bilateral or multilateral conventions, 65 as well as
the attempt by the International Law Commission to produce a Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.66 But obstacles to
60. JACKSON, supra note 44, at xv. In issuing its judgment after nine months of trial,
the Tribunal addressed many of the objections raised by the defendants to its jurisdic-
tion and the law it was asked to apply. First, in rejecting the defendants' arguments
based on state sovereignty, SECRE'rY GENE.'Cs MEmOp.ANDUM, supra note 48, at 39-40,
the Tribunal held that individuals could be criminally responsible under international
law--"[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of inter-
national law be enforced." IMT Judgment, supra note 54, at 221. Second, the Court
affirmed the primacy of international law over national law: "the very essence of the
Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obli-
gations of obedience imposed by the individual State." Id.
61. Of course, arguments may be made that this was possible only because of Ger-
many's unconditional surrender (and subsequent loss of sovereignty). That argument
appears more persuasive as an explanation for the de facto power of the Allies to estab-
lish the tribunal and try the defendants than as an inherent limitation on the power of
the Allies to try a suspect of an international crime (admittedly, very loosely defined) by
an international tribunal.
62. As Justice Jackson points out, "[t]he power of the precedent is the power of the
beaten path." JACKsoN, supra note 44, at xv (quoting Cardozo, J.). Of course, that is not
to say that the IMT's judgment is binding upon either municipal or international courts.
Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22, at 311.
63. Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22, at 312.
64. Although many countries continued, at least formally, to adhere to this princi-
ple. See infra note 70.
65. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 78, 113 and accompanying text.
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the Court's establishment still remained.
The topic was immediately considered by the United Nations after the
war in connection with the formulation and adoption of the Genocide Con-
vention.6 7 Although the Genocide Convention was adopted relatively
quickly,68 efforts to create the international criminal tribunal envisaged in
article VI of the Convention failed. Indeed, the reference to an interna-
tional penal tribunal now found in article VI of the Genocide Convention
had been deleted from earlier drafts,69 and was restored only after exten-
sive debate.70 In a resolution accompanying the adoption of the Genocide
Convention, the General Assembly invited the International Law Commis-
sion, along with its work on the codification of international criminal law,
to "study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international
judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other
crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by inter-
national conventions." 7 1 It also requested the Commission to consider the
possibility that this might be accomplished through the creation of a Crim-
inal Chamber of the International Court of Justice. 72
Thus instructed, the International Law Commission embarked upon
what would prove to be a frustrating and long endeavor. The ILC ulti-
mately voted at its Second Session in 1950 to support the desirability and
feasibility of creating an international criminal court.7 3 However, an exam-
ination of the Summary Records and Reports on the topic shows that the
Commission was deeply divided on this subject. 74 Indeed, two reports on
67. U.N. HroiucAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 25. Genocide was condemned as an
international crime on December 11, 1946, by G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess.,
55th plen. mtg., reprinted in 1 UNrrED NATIONs REsOLltrIONS, SnEuS 1175 (DusanJ. Djo-
novich ed., 1957), which also charged the Economic and Social Council with drafting a
convention on the crime of genocide. It was also raised in connection with the General
Assembly's request to the International Law Commission that it formulate the Nurem-
berg principles.
68. Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III), 6th
Comm., 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg., at 174-77, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
69. U.N. HtsrowcAI SURVEY, supra note 20, at 41.
70. The Soviet delegation, in particular, objected to the creation of an international
penal jurisdiction on the grounds that it would violate national sovereignty. U.N. Hs.
TORICAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 35. Others felt that the organization of an interna-
tional criminal court was premature either because there existed no international
criminal law or because there existed as yet no international enforcement mechanism.
Id. at 37. Upon the insistence, in particular, of the French delegation and a compromise
proposal made by the United States representative who suggested that the jurisdiction of
the proposed international penal tribunal become optional, the provision was restored.
71. Study by the Int'l Law Comm. of the Question of an Int'l Crim. Jurisdiction, G.A.
Res. 260B(III), U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg., at 177, U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948).
72. Id.
73. The issue was placed on the agenda of the first session. Summary records of the
17th Meeting, [1949] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 129, 219-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949.
74. The ILC adopted a formulation of the Nuremberg principles, discussed the Draft
Code, and after heated debate, voted 8-1 with two abstentions, that it was desirable to
establish an international penal judicial organ, and 7-3, with one abstention, that the
establishment of an international criminal judicial organ was possible. Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N.
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the international criminal court were presented to the Commission at this
time. The first, by Ricardo Alfaro, concluded that such a jurisdiction was
both "desirable" and "possible."75 The second, by Emil Sandstr6m, con-
cluded that although the creation of an International Criminal Court was
possible, it was not desirable.76 Sandstr6m opined that the creation of
such a court would "do more harm than good."77
Although the Commission ultimately adopted a Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1954,78 the General
Assembly removed the question of the court which might enforce such a
code from the ILC, and vested it in a committee composed of the represent-
atives of seventeen Member States.79 As was subsequently noted, the Gen-
eral Assembly's action involved a reversal of roles that was curious, to say
the least: it had asked a body of jurists a political question (whether the
creation of the court was desirable) and had subsequently entrusted a
political body with the technical task of elaborating a draft statute.80
Doc. No. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 364, 374-78, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1; Summary Records of the 43d Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949.
75. Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/15 (1950),
reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1
(Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur). In so concluding, Alfaro outlined the bases
upon which he felt such a jurisdiction could operate, some aspects of which have been
retained in the 1994 Draft Statute. He called for the "international organ of penal jus-
tice" to exercise its jurisdiction over States as well as individuals, and contemplated that
it would try crimes to be defined in an international penal code. Only the Security
Council (or a State authorized by it) would institute proceedings, and he suggested that
the Criminal Court or Chamber would be a permanent body, but would "sit in plenary
session only when it is seized of proceedings for an offence within its jurisdiction." Id.
Finally, he concluded that it would be possible to constitute the international criminal
court as a chamber of the ICJ, but only if the ICJ's Statute was amended to permit it to
hear cases against individuals. Id.
76. Id. (Emil Sandstr6m, Special Rapporteur). Although agreeing that international
criminal law had advanced to the stage where such a tribunal would have law to apply,
id. at 21, Sandstr6m considered the lack of an enforcement mechanism and the political
objections of States to be insurmountable obstacles.
77. Id. at 23. In Sandstr6m's opinion:
No organization does exist to enforce an appearance before the Court or the
execution of its judgements, and it seems difficult to establish such an organiza-
tion. The jurisdiction therefore is likely to be limited and brought into action in
a haphazard way. There are great risks that culprits will not always be brought
before the Court. On the whole this will give the impression that the jurisdic-
tion is being exercised in an arbitrary way. Its deterring effect will thus be very
doubtful, if any.
Id. at 22, c1 34.
78. Summary Records of the 280th Meeting, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/
2693 (1954), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 195, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1954/Add.1.
79. International Criminal Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 489 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
320th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, at 77, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The resolution added
that the committee was to "meet in Geneva on 1 August 1951 for the purpose of prepar-
ing one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establish-
ment of an international criminal court." Id.
80. Summary Records of the 1758th Meeting, [1983] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 21, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983, paraphrasing LOMBois, DROrr PLNAI. INTERNATIONAL, supra
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• The Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction met in Geneva
during the month of August 1951, by the end of which it had agreed to a
draft statute (the Geneva draft) for an international criminal court.81 The
Committee was careful to point out that it did not consider its terms of
reference to include the issue of the desirability of the Court's establish-
ment; rather, its task was to elaborate concrete proposals for the considera-
tion of the General Assembly to permit it "to appreciate the full scope of the
problems involved."8 2
A detailed examination of the Committee's work reveals many features
that reappear in the 1994 ILC Draft. First, the Committee decided that
although establishment of the Court as a United Nations organ would be
the most satisfactory course, in light of the practical difficulties involved in
amending the charter and the legal difficulties one might encounter in
attempting to establish the Court by General Assembly Resolution, a multi-
lateral convention would be the most appropriate mechanism for the
Court's creation. 83 Like the current version, the Court was also envisaged
as a "semi-permanent" institution that would hold sessions only when mat-
ters before it required consideration.8 4
The statute makes little mention of the proposed court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, providing only that it would "try persons accused of
crimes under international law, as may be provided in conventions or spe-
cial agreements among States parties to the present Statute."85 This nar-
row provision was opposed by several members of the Committee "on the
note 56, at 83. Professor Lombois attributes this to "the confiscation by politicians of
an idea which terrified them," id., although the General Assembly's stated reasons were
that it removed this issue from the ILC because it thought that the Commission was
already over-burdened with work Moreover, because the draft statute would ultimately
have to be approved by the General Assembly, it would be better if the original draft were
prepared by representatives acting in accordance with the instructions of their govern-
ments. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 5th Sess., 240th mtg., at 200, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.240
(1950).
81. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th
Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951 Committee Report].
82. Id. at 2, 7 11. The Committee members also made it dear that no member of the
Committee would be committing his government to any of the Committee's decisions by
participating in the Committee's deliberations and voting on the draft texts. Id. 12.
83. Id. at 3.
84. 1951 Committee Report, supra note 81, art. 3. The draft statute envisaged a nine-
judge court, art. 5, that would sit in plenary session without chambers. Although a
proposal to divide the court into chambers was made, it was ultimately rejected by the
Committee. Proponents argued that it would render the court's work more efficient and
perhaps permit a "certain element of regionalism" by permitting a regional group of
States to confer jurisdiction upon the court that would be exercised by a specially indi-
cated chamber of the court with regard to international crimes committed within this
group. Opponents argued that the chambers might be less balanced and compromise
the unity of the court's jurisprudence in the absence of a system of plenary appeals. Id.
at 6, c 46-47. Members would be elected from among nominees by the States' parties,
arts. 7-11, and who could be re-elected. Id. art. 12.1. No two judges could be of the
same nationality, id. arts. 6.2 & 11.2, and in light of the semi-permanent nature of the
court, would receive both a daily allowance as well as an annual remuneration of a
"symbolic nature." Id. art. 22, cmt. at 7, '1 55.
85. Id. art. 1.
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ground that it might be construed as leaving outside the scope of the court
a vast field of international crimes, which could then only be tried by spe-
cial international tribunals."86 Opponents could not carry enough votes to
remove the limiting phrase, however, and it was retained. 87 The Court
would hear cases against natural persons only,88 and only in cases in
which the state or states of the accused's nationality and the state or states
in which the crime was alleged to have been committed had conferred
jurisdiction upon the court.89
Proceedings could be instituted either by a State party to the statute, if
that State had conferred jurisdiction upon the Court over the offenses
involved in the proceedings, or by the General Assembly of the United
Nations (or an organization of States authorized by it).90 After a complaint
was filed, an institution called the "Committing Authority," composed of
nine individuals elected in the same manner, for the same terms and pos-
sessing the same qualifications as the judges, would establish whether the
evidence supported the complaint. 91 The prosecution would be conducted
86. 1951 Committee Report, supra note 81, at 5, cl 36.
87. Id. TcI 20, 37.
88. Including heads of state or agents of government. Id. art. 25. The question of
the criminality of States is a difficult one that has continually troubled commentators.
Although, as Doudou Thiam would point out some thirty years later in his report to the
ILC on the Draft Code of Offenses, it might be desirable to impose moral culpability on
states, such an endeavor could border, as he put it, on science fiction:
Toppling the State from the lofty pedestal where it was held in awe like the gods
of antiquity, making it an immanent creature, susceptible to error and wrongdo-
ing and prescribing for it a course of conduct and a code of ethics to be followed
under pain of coercive sanctions would dearly amount to a complete reversal of
hitherto prevailing ideas and concepts.
First Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N.
GAOR, 35th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/364 (1983) (Doudou Thiam, Special
Rapporteur) [hereinafter First Thiam Report]. The Commission subsequently sought
guidance from the General Assembly on the issue whether the Draft Code was to cover
offenses committed by States as well as natural persons. Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fifth Session, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) cl 69,
U.N. Doc. No. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 2). The General Assembly responded by seeking the
opinion of Member State governments, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Secur-
ity of Mankind, G.A. Res. 38/132, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., 101st plen. mtg., at 268, U.N.
Doc. A/38/665 (1983). Ultimately, it was decided that the Code would apply to individ-
uals only. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth
Session, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) cl 32, U.N. Doc. A/39/10 (1984), reprinted in
[1984] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 2).
89. 1951 Committee Report, supra note 81, art. 27. This declaration could either be
made prior to the crime's commission or afterwards by special agreement or unilateral
declaration. Id. art. 26. Finally, article 28 provides that no jurisdiction may be con-
ferred upon the Court without prior approval by the General Assembly. Apparently, the
Committee's concern was that otherwise, nothing would prevent two or more states
from entering into a convention between themselves conferring jurisdiction on the pro-
posed court over crimes not recognized as such by the prevailing opinion of the world.
Id. 74.
90. Id. art. 29.
91. Id. art. 33. The Committee rejected a proposal that would have permitted the
screening process to decide whether a trial was expedient, not only from the point of
view of world politics, but more generally whether it was in the public interest. 1951
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by an ad hoc prosecutor selected on a case-by-case basis by a panel of per-
sons designated by the States' parties for that purpose.92 Although the
judgment would be final and without appeal,9 3 a provision for revision of
the judgment,9 4 as well as a Board of Clemency,9 5 were included in the
draft provisions. 96
Very few Member States commented upon the proposed statute. The
United Kingdom expressed the view that "the whole project [was] funda-
mentally unsound."9 7 The French and Dutch delegations were more opti-
mistic, and the General Assembly requested the formation of another
seventeen member state Committee to re-examine several of the issues and
submit another report.9
8
The second Committee met in New York during the summer of 1953
(the "1953 Committee") and issued its report with an amended version of
the Statute annexed thereto. 9 9 The 1953 Committee modified the Geneva
Committee Report, supra note 81, at 13, 1 116. Instead, it was decided that the purpose
of the screening process would be limited to determining whether there was a primafacie
case against the accused. Id. at 14, 1 117.
92. Id. art. 34.
93. Id. art. 50.
94. Id. art. 53.
95. Id. art. 54.
96. The statute also provides for the rights of the accused, id. arts. 36, 38, 39, 41, 51,
and contains very limited provisions on national cooperation. Article 31 permits the
Court to request assistance from states, and provides that states shall only be obliged to
assist the Court if they have accepted to do so in some other international instrument.
Thus, although Article 40 permits the court to issue arrest warrants, nothing obliges
states to honor them. Similarly, although Article 32 permits the court to impose the
penalties it deems appropriate (subject to any limitations prescribed in the instrument
conferring jurisdiction upon the court), nothing obliges states to assist in the enforce-
ment of those penalties. Indeed, Article 52 (execution of sentences) requires the court to
make ad hoc arrangements for the carrying out of sentences. Finally, the statute pro-
vides that it shall not prejudice the right of States to establish special tribunals to try
perpetrators of crimes under international law. Id. art. 55.
97. See Comments received from governments regarding the report of the Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 52, at
1, U.N. Doc. A/2186 and Add.1 (1952).
98. International Criminal Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 687, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., 400th
plen. mtg., at 62, U.N. Doc. No. A/2361 (1952). The debate in the United States is well-
expressed by two articles in the 1952 American Bar AssociationJournal. The first, writ-
ten by Judge JohnJ. Parker, An International Criminal Court: The Case for its Adoption,
38 A.B.A. J. 641 (1952), lauds the Draft Statute as "a triumph of American leadership in
a delicate area of international affairs and one which will mean much to the future peace
of the world if it is given the support which it deserves." Id. In contrast, the second,
written by George A. Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case Against its Adop-
tion, 38 A.B.A. J. 644 (1951), notes that the Draft Statute did not include the right to trial
by jury and stated that the creation of the court would "involve very real dangers to the
future development of international good feeling and co-operation, in the instance where
proceedings were instituted against an aggressor with whom the United Nations wanted
to reach a negotiated settlement." Id.
99. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR,
9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1954) [hereinafter 1953 Committee Report].
Again, many members suggested that the whole idea was premature, although others
favored the court's establishment. Id. JTI 17, 18. Members also debated whether the
court should at once exhibit the qualities of stability, permanence, independence, effec-
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text in some respects, although not fundamentally. The proposed court's
jurisdiction was expanded to "crimes generally recognized under interna-
tional law,"100 and the number of judges increased to fifteen. 101 The arti-
cle on attribution of jurisdiction was also modified to specify that
"jurisdiction of the Court is not to be presumed,"10 2 and to state precisely
that acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction did not bind a State to bring
specific cases before the Court but only permitted a State to do so. 10 3 The
new draft also included an express provision on the powers of States to
withdraw jurisdiction once conferred on the Court,10 4 and deleted the
requirement that jurisdiction be approved by the General Assembly.' 0 5
Interestingly, although the 1953 Draft removed the power of the
United Nations to institute proceedings, it proposed, as one alternative, to
permit a United Nations organ "to be designated by the United Nations" to
stop proceedings in a particular case "[i]n the interest of the maintenance of
peace.' 10 6 This amendment reflected an ongoing debate (which would
resurface later) concerning the degree of control that the United Nations
should be able to exert over the international criminal court to the extent it
feels necessary "to do so" in the interest of peace. 10 7 The revised draft also
departed from the admittedly cumbersome system for the selection of the
prosecuting attorney by special panel and adopted a provision whereby the
complaining state or states would appoint (and presumably pay)10 8 the
prosecuting attorney.10 9
The 1951 and 1953 Committee Reports were never implemented for
lack of a political consensus on the desirability of creating an international
tiveness and universality, or whether a less perfect court would initially suffice. Id. q1
19, 20.
100. Id. art. 1.
101. Id. art. 5. Under the Geneva Draft, the number was nine and a quorum seven.
The Comment states that the number was expanded both to prevent the Court from
being paralyzed by the illness or incapacity of three members, as well as to satisfy the
need to have five judges serve as members of the Committing Chamber under the new
system proposed by Article 33 of the 1953 draft. Id. q 64.
102. Id. art. 26.
103. Id. l 95, cnn. The Comment adds, "[u]nless otherwise provided in the instru-
ment, the only duty following from the conferment of jurisdiction would be passively to
allow persons to be tried." Id.
104. Id. art. 28. This article provided that any notification of a State's withdrawal of
jurisdiction would be effective one year after delivery of notice.
105. Id. q 102. It was thought that this requirement would interfere with the sover-
eignty of states and would introduce an element of uncertainty as well as a political
element into the conferment of jurisdiction.
106. Id. art. 29, alt. B.
107. Finally, the revised draft streamlined the preliminary evaluation of the case by
the Committing Authority originally proposed by the Geneva draft. 1953 Committee
Report, supra note 99, at 18. In its stead, the revised draft proposed that a Committing
Chamber of five judges be constituted to examine the sufficiency of the evidence in
complaints brought to the Court. Id. art. 33. In addition, the amended article would
permit the Committing Chamber to order further inquiry of the investigation of specific
matters if necessary. Id. art. 33(5).
108. The comments do not address this, but the deletion of the prosecution from
Article 23 (finances) makes this point implicit.
109. 1953 Committee Report, supra note 99, art. 34.
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criminal court. Indeed, the idea was stalled in the United Nations for the
next thirty-five years. 110 The General Assembly was at the time deadlocked
on the problem of defining aggression, a task that took the General Assem-
bly twenty years to complete.111
Work on the International Criminal Court was resumed in 1989, when
the General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to
address the "question of establishing an international criminal court or
other international criminal trial mechanism with jurisdiction over persons
alleged to have committed crimes which may be covered under [the Draft
Code of Crimes]." 112 The ILC provisionally adopted a Draft Code of
110. On December 4, 1954, the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a
special committee of Member States to prepare a draft definition of aggression. Question
of Defining Aggression, G.A. Res. 895, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/2890 (1954). At the same meeting, the Assembly resolved to postpone further
consideration of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
until the Special Committee had submitted its report on aggression. Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 897, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 21, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). Ten days later, the Assembly postponed
its consideration of the question of an international criminal jurisdiction based on its
postponement and consideration of the Draft Code of Offenses and problem of aggres-
sion. International Criminal Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 898, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No.
21, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). For a discussion of vhy the United Nations efforts
to establish an international criminal tribunal failed, see Blakesley, supra note 2, at 84.
111. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 29th Sess.,
2319th mtg., at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1975). Of course, the adoption of the definition
by the General Assembly in no way alleviated the thorny question of who could make
such a determination. That is, if aggression was to be included in the Draft Code of
Crimes, would it be the role of the Security Council or a judicial organ to institute pro-
ceedings against offenders accused of committing it? The ILC's discussions on the role
of the Security Council are illuminating in this regard. See infra note 190.
112. The resolution was introduced by a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin
American nations led by Trinidad and Tobago. Their initiative is described in Summary
records of the meetings of the forty-second session, [1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 36, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990, at 39. Because their concern was with the problem of extra-
diting and prosecuting international narco-terrorists, the resolution went on to specify
that the ILC should specifically address the crime of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs
across national frontiers, and presumably discuss the international criminal court (or
other trial mechanism) in that context. G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/44/39 (1989). It was also prompted by repeated requests
from the ILC to the General Assembly as to what judicial authority would implement the
Draft Code of Crimes that the ILC had again been requested to draft. Immediately upon
resuming work on the Draft Code, members of the ILC pointed out the need to establish
a mechanism for the Code's eventual implementation. See, e.g., First Thiam Report,
supra note 88, i 63, 67 (suggesting that the ILC should seek the General Assembly's
opinion on the need for an international criminal court to enforce the code); Summary
Records of the Thirty-Fifth Session, [1983] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SERA/1983 (comments of McCaffrey: "[i]t would be inadvisable, if not dangerous, to
make the code applicable to individuals without, at the same time, establishing an inter-
national criminal court."). In its Report on the 35th Session, the ILC specifically
requested the General Assembly's opinion on whether it was to draft an International
Criminal Court statute, or not. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its thirty-fifth session, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 69, U.N. Doc. No. A/38/10
(1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comrn'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/
Add.1 (Part 2). Indeed, it repeated the question several times. See, e.g., Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-eighth session, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/41/10 (1986), reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1,
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Crimes in 1991113 and in its forty-fourth session in 1992, created a work-
ing group on an international criminal court. 114 The Working Group pro-
duced an extensive report outlining the general bases upon which, in its
opinion, the establishment of such a Court could proceed. 1 1 Not all the
Commission's members were pleased with the relatively modest proposals
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1986/Add.1 (Part 2). Finally, On December 9, 1988, the
Assembly asked the ILC to consider the question of the Code's implementation. Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 43/164, U.N. GAOR,
43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 280, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).
113. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session,
46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2). The ILC adopted a
new version of the Draft Code in July 1996. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
eighth session, 6 May-26July 1996, GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10 [hereinaf-
ter 1996 Draft Code]. For a fine appraisal of the 1991 draft, see Timothy L.H. McCor-
mack & Gerry J. Simpson, The International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions, 5
CiM. L. FORUM 1 (1994).
114. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session,
47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 9, U.N. Doc. No. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted in [1992] 2
Y.B. Intl. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1992/Add.1 (Part 2). For a preliminary
treatment of some of the issues ultimately addressed by the working group, see the
reports presented to the Commission on the creation of an international criminal court
by Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam, and the Commission's responses thereto. The
Special Reporter submitted a short report to the ILC offering the Commission some
choices among the various possible solutions to the question of an International Crimi-
nal Court in 1990. Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/430 (1990), reprinted in [1990] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990/Add.1 (Part 1), at 36 (Doudou Thiam,
Special Rapporteur). The Commission was generally favorable, albeit cautious, to the
idea of an International Criminal Court. Summary Records of the Forty-Second Session,
[1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990. See, e.g., the com-
ments of Mr. Graefrath: The establishment of an International Criminal Court would be
an historic move, but "extreme care and circumspection had to be applied in approach-
ing the issue." Id. 1 33. See also Report of the International Law Commission on the work
of itsforty-second session, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), '1155, U.N. Doc. No. A/45/10
(1990), reprinted in [1990] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990/
Add.1 (Part 2) at 24. In his Ninth and Tenth Reports on the Draft Code of Crimes, Ninth
Report on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc.
No. A/CN.4/435 and Add.1 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1991/Add.1 (Part 1) (Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur); Tenth
Report on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc.
No. A/CN.4/442 (1992) (Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter Tenth Thiam
Report], Thiam continued to present the Commission with options concerning the possi-
ble features of an international criminal court.
115. The ILC adopted the basic propositions of the Working Group, as follows:
- An international criminal court should be established by a statute in the form
of a treaty agreed to by States parties;
- In the first phase of its operations, at least, the court should exercise jurisdic-
tion only over private persons as distinct from States;
- The court's jurisdiction should be limited to crimes of an international char-
acter defined in specified international treaties in force. These should
include the crimes defined in the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind (upon its adoption and entry into force), but should not
be limited to the Code. It should be possible for a State to become a party to
the statute without thereby becoming a party to the Code;
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made by the working group. But, as the Group's chair, Abdul Koroma,
pointed out, the proposals represented a compromise between those who
would have gone much further and those who felt that nothing should be
done at all.'1 6 With one exception,'1 7 these proposals, which were them-
selves largely based on the work of the 1951 and 1953 Committees, were
substantially adopted in the 1994 Draft Statute.
11. An Analysis of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court
Following the Commission's report, the General Assembly granted the ILC
a mandate to elaborate a draft statute "as a matter of priority,""18 even
though many countries (including the United States) did not support the
Draft Code of Crimes."19 The project gained momentum after the creation
- The court would essentially be a facility for States parties to its statute (and
also on defined terms, other States). In the first phase of its operations, at
least, it should not have compulsory jurisdiction, in the sense of a general
jurisdiction which a State party to the statute is obliged to accept ipso facto
and without further agreement;
- In the first phase of its operations, at least, the court would not be a standing
full-time body. On the other hand, its constituent instrument should not be a
mere draft or proposal, which would have to be agreed on before the institu-
tion could operate. Thus the statute should establish a legal mechanism
which could be available to be called into operation as and when required;
- Whatever the precise structure of the court or other mechanism, it must guar-
antee due process, independence and impartiality in its procedures.
Report of the Working Group on the question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session, 47 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B. Intl L.
Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 2), at 58 (footnotes omitted).
116. Id. at 6-7. See also id. c 19.
117. Article 20 of the 1994 Draft contains a more expansive notion of the Court's
jurisdiction than was originally proposed.
118. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of it forty-second session,
G.A. Res. 47/33, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 129, at 287, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
119. UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, COMMENrs AND OBSEVATIONS
ON THE DRAFr CODE OF CRIMEs AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANIND ADOPTED ON
FIRST READING BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AT ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/448 and Add.1 (1993), [hereinafter COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS]. Com-
ments and observations received from Great Britain and Northern Ireland indicated that
the UK did not support the code and shared the widespread view that work on the court
should not be coupled with that on the Code. Id. at 85. Specifically, the UK criticized
the ILC for producing a code evidencing "haste and lack of precision," id. at 89, and
which embodied "little more than political slogans into a code intended as a legal instru-
ment," id. at 91. Comments and observations received from the United States of
America stated that:
[t]he United States ... does not support the present draft Code because it is
defective in many fundamental respects. Since many of the offences set forth in
the draft Code are already covered by existing international conventions, much
of the draft Code is either redundant or disruptive (especially where it deviates
from existing statements of the law). Moreover, many of its suggestions for the
development of new criminal offences are unacceptable to the United States.
Throughout, the draft Code ignores basic concepts of criminal liability (for
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of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by
the Security Councl,120 which suggested that the need for a permanent
court was not merely theoretical, and that governments, including the
United States, would be willing to support the creation of an international
criminal tribunal, at least under some circumstances. 121 The ILC consid-
ered two draft statutes 122 before finally adopting a final version in 1994.
Although the statute is not entirely coherent, 123 it represents a considera-
ble effort and has been quite useful as a basis for further discussion of the
many issues raised by the establishment and functioning of the Court.124
The most important features of the draft statute are discussed below. They
are critiqued, however, in Part II.
example, the state of mind necessary to be charged with a criminal violation). It
also neglects concepts of due process basic to the United States and many other
countries' jurisprudence, such as that offences must be defined with precision
sufficient to inform people of what acts will be considered criminal.
Id. at 94.
120. MoRRs & SCHAF, supra note 3, at 351-55. See also James O'Brien, The Interna-
tional Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia,
87 AM. J. ITr'r L. 639 (1993).
121. The Commission was divided on the attention that the statute of the ad hoc
tribunal should receive. Some members felt that the ad hoc Tribunals' rules and statute
should receive particular attention in addressing similar issues arising with respect to
the permanent court; others felt that it would be inappropriate to place too much empha-
sis on the example furnished by the ad hoc Tribunals given the "essential differences"
between the two institutions. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its forty-sixth session, G.A. Res. 49/51, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda
Item 137, at 292, U.N. Doc. A/49/51 (1994). See also supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
122. The first was a 37-article draft produced by Doudou Thiam in his Eleventh
Report to the Commission on the Draft of Crimes. Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/449 (1993)
(Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter Eleventh Thiam Report]. The second
was a much longer document (67 articles) produced by the ILC's working group on a
draft statute for an international criminal court that was annexed to the ILC's report for
1993. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session,
Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an international Criminal Court, 48
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 100-32, U.N. Doc. A/48/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.1 (Part 2)
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Draft Statute]. The Working Group's draft was forwarded to the
General Assembly for comment, and became the basis for the 1994 draft finally adopted.
For a discussion of the 1993 Draft, see James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 140 (1994).
123. This is not surprising, given that the Working Group was trying to "amalgamate
into a coherent whole the most appropriate elements for the goals [of the International
Criminal Court] envisaged, having regard to existing treaties, earlier proposals for an
international court or tribunals and relevant provisions in national criminal justice sys-
tems within the different legal traditions." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 42, J 84.
124. In December of 1994 the General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court "to review the major substan-
tive and administrative issues" arising out of the ILC's 1994 Draft Statute. Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 293, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994). The Ad Hoc Committee made up essentially of
representatives from Member State Governments, issued a comprehensive report in
1995. See UN Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 17.
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Purpose: Prosecution and suppression of crimes of international concern. (Preamble 11)
Jurisdiction:
- most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole (Preamble 12)
- in cases in which national trials would not occur or would be ineffective (Preamble 13
& commentary)
Jurisdiction Rationae Materiae
(art. 20)
(c)
serious
violations
of the law and
customs
applicable
in armed
conflict
* see art. 3,
ICTY1
* see art. 22
Draft Code
* Not identical
to "grave
breaches"
under the
1949 Geneva
Conventions
(d)
crimes against
humanity
comments
* see art. 5,
ICTY
* art. 21,
Draft Code
(e)
annex treaty
crimes
comments
* only treaties
in force
* defining
crimes of an
international
character, and
* establishing
a broad
jurisdictional
basis for
trial of such
crimes
"ICTY" is the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
2 "Draft Code" is the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1991. The Draft Code was modified in 1996, see
supra note 113. War crimes are now addressed in article 20 and crimes against
humanity in article 18.
FIGURE 1
A. General Features
As envisaged by the Draft Statute, and as shown in Figure 1, the pur-
pose of the proposed Court is the prosecution and suppression of crimes
of international concern. 1 25 The statute contemplates that the Court 26
125. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, pmbl., cl 1.
126. In what might be considered somewhat confusing terminology, the Draft Statute
means by the term "Court," not just the judicial organs of the International Criminal
(a)
genocide
comments
* defined in
1948
Convention
* special
"inherent"
jurisdiction
regime, art.
25(l)
(b)
aggression
comments
* see G.A.
res. 3314 of
Dec. 14,
1974
* see U.N.
Charter art.
2(4)
* subject to
Security
Council
determination
art. 23(2)
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would only hear cases involving the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole, in cases in which national trials
would not occur or would be ineffective. 127 This follows the 1992 Working
Group's conclusion that the case for an international criminal court was
essentially a case for a trial court rather than an appellate or review
body.128 The twin declarations of purpose in the preamble are given fur-
ther effect in the provisions of the statute on jurisdiction (article 20) and
admissibility (article 35).129 They are also embodied in the principle of
complementarity, which, as defined in the preamble, means that the Court
"is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems." As
explained in the ILC's commentary:
[Tihe Court... [is] a body which will complement existing national juris-
dictions and existing procedures for international judicial cooperation in
criminal matters and which is not intended to exclude the existing jurisdic-
tion of national courts, or to affect the right of States to seek extradition and
other forms of international judicial assistance under existing
arrangements. 130
The 1994 Draft Statute, like the drafts produced by the 1951 and 1953
Committees, 131 envisages that the Court will have a close relationship with
the United Nations but will be established by multilateral treaty. 132 The
ILC thus rejected earlier proposals either that the international criminal
court be established as a chamber of the International Court of Justice or
that it be constituted as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations primarily
because of the need to amend the constituent documents of those organs in
Court, but the entire structure as conceived by the Statute, including the Registry, Presi-
dency, Judicial Chambers and Procuracy. The 1993 draft referred to the whole entity as
the "Tribunal" and reserved the term "Court" for the judicial organs. The commentary to
article 1 states that the name was changed because "some members thought it was unu-
sual to have a 'Court' within a 'Tribunal'." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 45. Others
preferred not to use the word "Tribunal" at all (in spite of its historic uses) in relation to
a permanent international criminal court. Id.
127. Id. pmbl., 5 2 & cmL
128. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session,
47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. No. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 2) at 1 37.
129. Other relevant provisions are article 27, which requires the Presidency to deter-
mine whether the admissibility criteria have been met, and Article 34, which permits the
accused and interested States to bring jurisdictional challenges. 1994 Draft Statute,
supra note 7, arts. 27, 34.
130. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 44.
131. See supra notes 83 and 99 and accompanying text.
132. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, pmbl., art. 2. There was substantial debate at
the August Preparatory Committee meetings concerning the number of signatures that
should be required for the entry-into-force of the treaty. Some states suggested that the
number should not be too high, for practical reasons; others that a high number of
signatures should be required in order to demonstrate the universality of the court.
Numbers proposed ranged from 30 to 45 States (Australia) to 90 states (Ukraine). Pre-
paratory Committee for International Criminal Court Continues Discussing Creation of
Court by Treaty, United Nations Department of Public Information Press Release, L/2808
(Aug. 26, 1996) <http://www.u.n.org./news/press> (copy on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Preparatory Committee].
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order to do so and the political difficulties that such might entail.133 Arti-
cle 2 of the statute attempts to forge a compromise between those who
believed that creation of the Court as a United Nations organ was essential
and those who saw that as impractical or undesirable. 13 4 The Commen-
tary suggests that the "close relationship envisaged" is necessary for
administrative purposes as well as to enhance the Court's "universality,
authority and permanence." 135 Too, the Court's jurisdiction in certain
instances is dependent on Security Council Decisions. 136 Finally, the
question of the Court's financing is sotto voce implied in this "close rela-
tionship"-unlike the 1951 and 1953 Committee drafts, the current propo-
sal has no article on how the Court is to be financed, leaving that question,
it seems, to State Parties.
137
B. Jurisdiction Rationae Materiae
The Commission had difficulty achieving a consensus on which crimes to
include in the Court's jurisdiction and the level of specificity to be used in
their definition. Part of the difficulty is that the proposed Court is oriented
towards two different problems. First, the Court will prosecute crimes
under international humanitarian law. Subject matter jurisdiction in this
case follows the general outlines of the Nuremberg Charter 138 which iden-
tified three categories of crimes: crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. 13 9 But many would like the Court to address
other international criminal activity as well, such as drug trafficking,
hijacking, piracy, and terrorism.
The dual role thus envisioned is further complicated by the somewhat
anarchic structure of international criminal law at present. As the 1993
Draft proposed by the Working Group points out, "international crimes"
can be divided into two general categories depending on their source:
those defined by treaties and crimes which have their basis in customary
international law. 14 0 The crimes within these two groups can be further
133. This controversy also surfaced in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee,
which supported the Commission's position based on the fact that the "express consent
of states was considered consistent with the principle of state sovereignty and.., legal
authority of the court." UN Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3.
134. The issues involving the Court's relationship with the United Nations are further
discussed in Appendix I to the 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7. See also infra Part Ill.B.5.
135. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 47.
136. Id. See also id. art. 23.
137. This is obviously a serious shortcoming, as discussed infra in Part I1I.B.5. As
pointed out elsewhere, the Court's funding must be sufficient and must be obtained in
such a way to avoid compromising the integrity of the Court. Daniel MacSweeney, Pros-
pects for the Financing of an International Criminal Court, WFM/IGP Discussion Paper,
August 1996. For a superb analysis of the practical and administrative issues, including
financing, relating to the Court, see Thomas Warrick, Organization of the International
Criminal Court: Administrative and Financial Issues, 13 NouvEuLES ETUES PENALES 37
(1997).
138. Also relevant, of course, in this respect are the jurisdictional provisions of the Ad
hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
139. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
140. 1993 Draft Statute, supra note 122, at 106-07, 109-10.
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classified in terms of the type of conduct criminalized. Some address
crimes under international law; others "merely provide for the suppression
of undesirable conduct constituting crimes under national law."'141
Crimes in the second category generally have their origin in the law of
international treaties. Crimes in the first category, however, may have their
source in customary international law or treaties or both; indeed, often cus-
tomary international law as well as one or more treaties may apply to the
same behavior.
The 1993 Draft Statute opted for a scheme that included within the
"core" jurisdictional article of the Statute only international crimes defined
by international treaty. 142 The 1993 Draft then set out a second strand of
jurisdiction in article 26, which would cover "crimes under a norm of inter-
national law accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as being of such fundamental character that its violation
gives rise to the criminal responsibility of individuals."143 In particular,
this would cover the case of genocide in the case of States not parties to the
Genocide Convention, and crimes against humanity not covered by the
Geneva Conventions. 144
This resulted in a complicated regime of jurisdiction and State consent
that could have made application of the statute to particular cases
extremely difficult. The 1994 Draft Statute simplified the jurisdictional
regime considerably, but in so doing it papered over some fairly fundamen-
tal problems. As illustrated in Figure 1, article 20 of the statute (on juris-
diction) grants the Court jurisdiction over five categories of offenses:
genocide, aggression, serious violations of the law and customs applicable
in armed conflict, crimes against humanity, and treaty crimes listed in an
annex.145 The nine treaty crimes included in the annex cover international
crimes and the transnational aspect of domestic crimes. 146 The crimes
under general international law were included, according to the Commis-
141. Id. at 107.
142. 1993 Draft Statute, supra note 122, art. 22.
143. Id. art. 26.
144. Id. at 110.
145. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 20.
146. See, e.g., Siracusa Draft, supra note 17, at 21-24. The Treaty Crimes included in
Article 20(e) are:
1. Grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Protocol
I Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts;
2. The unlawful seizure of aircraft as defined in the 1970 Hague Convention;
3. The crimes defined in article 1 of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation;
4. Apartheid and related crimes as defined in the 1973 Apartheid convention;
5. Crimes against internationally protected persons as defined in the 1973 con-
vention thereon;
6. Hostage-taking and related crimes defined in the 1979 Convention against
the Taking of Hostages;
7. Torture, as defined in the 1984 Convention;
8. Maritime crimes, as defined in the 1988 Convention and the 1988 Conven-
tion on unlawful acts against the safety of fixed Platforms; and
9. Crimes involving illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
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sion, based either on the crime's "magnitude, the continuing reality of [its]
occurrence or [its] inevitable international consequences." 147 Treaty
crimes were included based on two criteria:
(a) that the crimes are themselves defined by the treaty so that an interna-
tional criminal court could apply that treaty as law in relation to the crime,
subject to the nullum crimen guarantee...
(b) that the treaty created either a system of universal jurisdiction based on
the principle aut dedere aut judicare or the possibility for an international
criminal court to try the crime, or both, thus recognizing clearly the princi-
ple of international concern. 148
In this way the statute attempts to please both those who would like it
to cover breaches of international humanitarian law, and those who would
like it to address transnational criminal activity such as drug trafficking.
All crimes except genocide are subject to a complicated regime of State
consent;149 treaty crimes are subject to an additional requirement that the
treaty apply to the conduct in question.150 Unlike the Statute of the ICTY
and article 6 of the IMT Charter, none of the crimes are actually defined in
the statute. The Commission took the position that its function was
neither to define nor to codify crimes under general international law;
rather, it viewed the statute "primarily as an adjectival and procedural
instrument."15 1 While this is understandable from a political perspective
given the extent of States' dissatisfaction with the Draft Code of Crimes, it
is less than ideal from a legal perspective. 152
C. Organs of the Court
The 1994 Draft Statute contemplates that the Court will have four
principal organs: the Presidency; the Appeals Chamber, Trial Chambers
and other (Judicial) Chambers; the Procuracy; and the Registry. 153
The "international judicial system" thus constituted includes judicial,
administrative, and prosecutorial functions, and sets out the qualifications
147. Id. at 77-78.
148. Id. at 78.
149. See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text. The State consent regime does
not apply, however, if the Security Council refers the matter to the Court. 1994 Draft
Statute, supra note 7, art. 23.
150. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 39(b). See infra note 207 and accompanying
text.
151. Id. at 71. This position has been severely criticized, and many groups have pro-
posed substantive definitions of crimes to be included in the Court's Statute. See, e.g.,
Siracusa Draft, supra note 17, at 21-24.
152. The International Law Association's (American Branch) Committee on a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court, while not taking the position that international law
requires the definition of the crimes in the Court's statute, has, like other groups, urged
the inclusion of definitions in the Court's statute. See I.L.A. First Committee Report,
supra note 2, '1 13.
153. Id. art. 5. The government of the Netherlands proposed an additional institution
of an investigative judge. World Federalist Movement, Preparatory Committee for the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Summary prepared by Steven Gerber,
Aug. 20, 1996, at 1 (electronic source; copy on file with the author) [hereinafter World
Federalist Summary].
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Judicial Organization
Appeals Chamber
7 Judges
(President + 6 Judges)
art. 9(l)
Term: 3 years; if necessary, judges shall
serve through completion of any
case the hearing of which has
commenced. Judges may be
renewed for a second term.
Qualifications: At least three Judges
shall have recognized
competence in inter-
national law.
Other: *President shall preside over
the Appeals Chamber.
*Judges who are not members
of the Appeals Chamber shall
be available to serve on Trial
Chambers and other chambers,
and to act as substitute members
of Appeals Chamber if a
member is unavailable or
disqualified.
Trial Chambers(ad hoe)
5 Judges
art. 9(5)
Term: Through the given case.
Qualifications: *At least three Judges
shall have criminal trial
experience.
*President shall nominate
judges in accordance
with the Rules.
Other: *Alternate judges may be nominated
to attend trial and act as members
if a judge dies or becomes unavailable.
Notes: *No judge who is a national of a complainant State or of a State of which the
accused is a national shall be a member of a chamber with the case.
*Presidency may also constitute Indictment Chambers (art. 37) and Pardon,
Parole & Commutation of Sentences Chambers (art. 60(3)), as required. -
FIGURE 3
for and function of the members of each organ in turn. Only the Judicial
organs and the Procuracy will be discussed here, as they are the organs
primarily responsible for the Court's critical functions, although somewhat
ironically, the one truly permanent organ of the Court is the Registry.
154
The current proposal provides for the election of eighteen judges by
the States Parties to the Court's Statute.155 The judges of the International
Criminal Court, like their counterparts on the International Court of Jus-
tice, are to be "persons of high moral character" who possess "the qualifica-
154. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
155. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(3). Article 6 also provides that states are
to nominate two qualified persons of different nationality (art. 6(2)), that no two judges
are to have the same nationality (article 6(4)), and that the judges are to represent the
"principal legal systems of the world" (art. 6(5)).
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tions required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest
judicial office."156 Ten of the judges are to have criminal trial experience,
and eight are to have recognized competence in international law.' 5 7 The
judges are to be elected for one, non-renewable, nine-year term.158 One
third of the judges will be elected every three years. Cases will be tried to
five-judge, ad hoc, Trial Chambers constituted for each case. Appeals will
be to a seven-judge Appeals Chamber, presided over by the Court's Presi-
dent (see below), that will be reconstituted after each new election of
judges.15 9 Judges not members of the Appeals Chamber will be available
to sit on Trial Chambers, meaning that only two Trial Chambers may sit
simultaneously (although others could be constituted, as long as they were
not sitting).160
The judges elect the three members of the Presidency: the President,
the first and second Vice-Presidents (and their alternates). 161 Members of
the Presidency are elected for three-year terms, to coincide with the new
election of one-third of the judges. 162 As Figures 2, 3, and 5 show, it is
contemplated that the Presidency will be responsible for the administra-
tion of the Court, and also perform important functions with respect to the
156. Id. art. 6(1). It was also thought necessary to specify in the International Crimi-
nal Court Statute, that the judges have, in addition to high moral character, "impartiality
and integrity." Id. The ICJ Statute refers to the judge's "independence." Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bev-
ans 1179. The International Criminal Court statute, unlike the ICJ statute, would not
permit persons who would not be qualified for the highest judicial office in their coun-
tries to serve if they are "jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."
Id.
157. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(1). As the commentary points out, some
individuals may have both competencies. In such a case, the nominating States should
specify in which capacity the judge is expected to serve. Id. at 51. "The requirement of
criminal trial experience is understood to include experience as judge, prosecutor or
advocate in criminal cases. The requirement of recognized competence in international
law may be met by competence in international humanitarian law and international
human rights law." Id.
158. Id. art. 6(6). The 1993 Draft provided for a twelve- year term, which was thought
too long. 1993 Draft Statute, supra note 122, art. 7(6); 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7,
art. 6, cmt. Judges may continue in office beyond their term in order to finish a case that
has already commenced. Id. The article actually refers to the "hearing" of the case,
presumably requiring that the judge be actually involved in the trial (or appeal), in order
to qualify for an extension of term. Other articles addressing the judges' roles and per-
formance of their duties include article 7 (judicial vacancies), article 10(1) & (2) (inde-
pendence of the judges) and article 11 (excusing and disqualification of judges).
159. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 9(1).
160. Id. art. 9(4), cmt. The August Preparatory Committee Session included a lively
debate on the composition of the judicial chambers, the qualifications of judges, and the
powers of the Presidency. A sample of States' concerns included exploring an age limit
for the judges (Lesotho and France), gender balance (Norway), having the judges paid
full-time (Germany) and shorter terms with the possibility of re-election (United States
and Egypt). World Federalist Summary, supra note 153, at 3, 4.
161. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 8.
162. Id. art. 8(1), cmt. The Draft Statute is silent as to whether the President or Vice-
President may be re-elected; the Commentary, referring to the Presidency's "reconstitu-
tion" every three years, suggests not.
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review of indictments, 163 the constitution of Trial Chambers,16 4 and the
exercise of pretrial and other procedural functions conferred on the Court
prior to the seizure of a Trial Chamber in a particular case.165
The Procuracy is the organ responsible for investigating complaints
and for conducting prosecutions. 16 6 Like the judges, the officers of the
Procuracy (a Prosecutor and one or more Deputy Prosecutors) 167 are
elected by the States Parties. 16 8 Their independence is thought to be guar-
anteed by a series of limitations contained in article 12 of the Draft Statute:
no member of the Procuracy is to seek or act on instructions from any
external source, 16 9 and the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors shall not
act in relation to a complaint involving a person of their own
nationality.1 70
One curious, although unsurprising, feature of the Court is its "semi-
permanent" nature.' 71 Article 4 of the 1994 Draft Statute, consistent with
earlier proposals for a permanent International Criminal Court, provides
that the Court is a "permanent institution. . . [which] shall act when
required to consider a case submitted to it."172 This of course has implica-
tions for the functioning of its organs, which other than the Registry, 17 3 are
permitted under the Draft Statute to function "intermittently." 174 Thus,
article 12(4), on the Procuracy, provides that the Prosecutor and Deputy
Prosecutors may be elected on the basis that they are willing to serve "as
required," that is, on a "stand-by basis."175 As for the judges, only the
President is to receive an annual allowance; all other judges will be paid a
163. Id. art. 27.
164. Id. art. 9(5).
165. Id. art. 8(4). The Presidency is also required to convene a Chamber in the case
of an application for pardon, parole, or commutation of sentence. Id. art. 60(3). The
President is also a member of the Appeals Chamber. Id. art. 9(1).
166. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 12(1).
167. Id. art. 12(2). Staff appointed by the Prosecutor also appears to be considered
"members" of the Procuracy for purposes of art. 12. Id. art. 12(2).
168. Id. art. 12(3).
169. Id. art. 12(1).
170. Id. art. 12(5).
171. Professor Derby refers to it as a "stand-by court." Derby, supra note 15, at 311.
172. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 4. Many members objected to the semiper-
manent nature of the Court as being incompatible with the necessary "permanence, sta-
bility and independence of a true international criminal court." Id. art. 4, cmt.
173. Article 13(2) provides that the Registrar shall be available on a full-time basis.
174. The term is Doudou Thiam's, who wrote in 1993 that "[t]he permanence of such
a jurisdiction would not be incompatible with an intermittent functioning of its organs."
Eleventh Thiam Report, supra note 122, 1 58.
175. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 59, cmt., '1 3. Although, as stated above,
States Parties may apparently elect to have him or her (and the Deputy Prosecutors)
serve on a "stand-by" basis, the only provision with respect to the salaries (or the financ-
ing of their office, as well as the Registry) is a general note in the commentary to article
13, that "financial arrangements for the employment of staff will have to be made in
connection with the adoption of the Statute." Id. at 61. This is a problem that will need
to be addressed, preferably not in the manner which the 1953 Draft did, which provided
that the complainant state would essentially bear the cost. See supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
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per diem "during the period in which they exercise their functions." 176
Article 10(4), however, does provide that, if the workload of the Court
requires, the Presidency may recommend to the States Parties that the
judges serve full-time. Such a decision would require a two-thirds majority
of the States Parties. In such case, the judges would receive a full-time
salary. 177
D. Jurisdiction of the Court and the Initiation of Prosecution
As stated above, and as shown in Figure 1, article 20 sets forth the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.17 8 Rather than an elaboration of the
principles upon which the Court's jurisdiction rationae materiae is based,
this section focuses on the triggering of the Court's jurisdiction and the
mechanisms by which it can be invoked.
As Figure 4 shows, the drafters added additional requirements to the
invocation of the Court's jurisdiction in order to implement the principle
of complementarity. 179 The Commission attempted to accomplish this by
having different jurisdictional regimes for each of three categories of
crimes within the Court's subject matter jurisdiction: (i) genocide, (ii)
aggression, and (iii) all other crimes (i.e., crimes defined by Article 20(c),
(d), and (e)). 180 In each case, the Commission attempted to define which
states would be permitted to file complaints, which states, if any, would be
required to consent to the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction, and
what the role of the Security Council would be with respect to each of the
crimes in question. 181
1. Genocide
As this crime is clearly and authoritatively defined in the 1948 Genocide
Convention, which, in addition envisaged in article V11 82 the creation of an
international criminal court to try cases of genocide, the Commission took
the position that the Court should have inherent jurisdiction over this
crime, not dependent on the consent of States.' 83 Thus, article 25(1) pro-
vides that any state that is a party to the International Criminal Court Stat-
ute and to the Genocide Convention will be permitted to file a complaint.
The Security Council would not have any special role concerning cases of
genocide, but it would have, as a general rule, the right to refer a situation
176. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1), (3).
177. Id. art. 10(4).
178. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
179. "It is thus by the combination of a defined jurisdiction, clear requirements of
acceptance of that jurisdiction and principled controls on the exercise of jurisdiction
that the Statute seeks to ensure, in the words of the preamble, that the Court will be
complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures
may not be available or may be ineffective." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 69, cmt.
180. See Figure 1.
181. A majority of States, as well as the Commission, have consistently rejected the
possibility that individuals or NGOs might bring complaints to the Court, although not
all States have agreed. See infra note 197.
182. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
183. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 72. See also id. art. 21(1)(a).
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Jurisdictional Regimes
Security Council Referral Complaint filed By a
of a Matter (art. 23(1)) State (art. 21)
Procuracy will initiate prosecution in individual Procure
cases. Circumvents regime of State consent in
arts. 21 and 22.
Genocide
Files a Complaint under art.
23(1) by a State that is
(i) a party to the Genocide
Convention; and
(ii) a party to the ICC
Statute
All other Crimes
Aggression
Security Council must
make a determination of
Aggression (art. 23)
Files a Complaint under art.
25(2) by a State that is
(i) a Party to the ICC
Statute; and
(ii) has accepted the Court's
jurisdiction under art. 22
Preconditions to Jurisdiction
(i) Custodial State and (ii) State in which act or omission
in question occurred ("Territorial State") must also accept
Court's jurisdiction (art. 21 (1)(b)) as well as (iii) a State that
has already established or eventually establishes its right to
the extradtion of the accused pursuant to an extradition
request. (art. 21(2))
Note: No prosecution for any crimes without Security Council agreement in situations
actually being dealt with as breaches of the peace or acts of Aggression under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter (art. 23(3)). (Comments, p. 87).
FIGURE 4
involving genocide to the International Criminal Court under article 23(1).
In addition, article 23(3) provides that the Court will not be permitted to
prosecute cases of genocide (or any crime) without the agreement of the
Security Council in situations actually being dealt with as breaches of the
peace or acts of aggression under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.'
8 4
2. Aggression
Under article 21(2), if a State files a complaint under article 25(2), the
jurisdiction of the Court is dependent upon several factors. First, the State
184. Id. art. 23(3), 87. This, of course, gives the Security Council a veto over judicial
proceedings in some cases. Given the International Criminal Court's independent sta-
tus, how the Security Council would actually exercise this veto is unclear. It would
presumably have to be specified in the agreement between the Court and the UN envis-
aged by article 2.
Jurisdictional Regimes
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having custody of the suspect with respect to the crime (the "Custodial
State") 185 must accept the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crime in
question (i.e., aggression). 186 Second, the State on the territory of which
the act or omission in question occurred must accept the Court's jurisdic-
tion with respect to the crime.187 Third, acceptance of a State which has
already established or eventually establishes its right to the extradition of
the accused pursuant to an extradition request must be obtained.1 8
Finally, under article 23(2), the case "may not be brought... unless the
Security Council has first determined that a State has committed the act of
aggression which is the subject of the complaint."18 9 Thus, the initiation
of any prosecution of the crime of aggression is within the power of the
Security Council.190
185. The Commentary suggests that this is necessary because of the strong presump-
tion that the Court will have the accused before it for trial, id. at 80, and defines "Custo-
dial State" broadly to cover not only the situation in which a State had arrested the
suspect for a crime, but also situations in which a State's armed forces are "visiting"
another State and has captured a suspect. In such case the State to which the force
belongs and not the host State would be considered the custodian. Id.
186. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 21(1)(b)(i).
187. Id. art. 21(1)(b)(ii).
188. Id. art. 21(2). Presumably the extradition request must precede the Court's
attempt to exercise jurisdiction, for the article refers to the Custodial State having
"received" the request for extradition. The Statute also provides that the State requesting
extradition does not need to consent to the Court's jurisdiction if the Custodial State
rejects its extradition request. This effectively allows the Custodial State to block prose-
cution by the international court or any State requesting extradition, except in the case
of Treaty crimes to which that state is a party. In such a case, article 54 of the 1994
Draft Statute provides:
[a] custodial State party to this Statute which is a party to the treaty in question
but which has not accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crime for
the purposes of article 21(1)(b)(i) shall either take all necessary steps to extra-
dite the suspect to a requesting State for the purpose of prosecution or refer the
case to its competent authorities for that purpose.
Id. art. 54. As the Commentary notes, this imposes an aut dedere autjudicare obligation
on the Custodial State. Id. at 81.
189. Id. art. 23(2).
190. Aggression has been particularly difficult for the I.L.C. to address. In its debates
in 1991 on the Draft Code of Crimes, the Commission split on this question. Many
members thought that the problem was one of separation of powers and opposed mak-
ing the institution of criminal proceedings contingent on prior determination by the
Security Council of an act or threat of aggression. They thought that while it might be
that a determination that there was aggression should bind the court, it could be shock-
ing if the Security Council did not find aggression because a state exercised its veto, for
example. This would create a double standard which although understandable from a
political standpoint was not legally permissible. Other members, however, argued that,
under the Charter, the determination of aggression is up to the Security Council. The
Court was required to respect this, although it could then independently determine the
issue of individual responsibility. Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Forty-third session, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991),
reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part
2), cl 154. Aggression is included, but not defined in the 1996 Draft Code. See 1996
Draft Code, supra note 113.
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3. Other Crimes
The Court's exercise of jurisdiction over crimes other than genocide and
aggression is subject to the same regime of State consent outlined with
respect to aggression if a complaint is filed by a State.19 1 The only differ-
ence is that, although the Security Council may refer the matter to the
Court if it so chooses (in which case no State consent regime is applicable),
there is no requirement that it do so.
Thus, in all cases other than genocide and referrals of a matter to the
Court by the Security Council, the prosecution of cases is dependent on
State consent, the rules of which are detailed in article 22. The 1993 Work-
ing Group had proposed three alternative versions to article 22 (which was
numbered article 23 in the prior draft). Alternatives A and C embodied an
"opting-in" system, similar to that described above. Alternative B was an
"opting-out" system whereby states adhering to the Court's statute auto-
matically consented to the Court's jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in
the statute unless they declared that they did not.192 The 1994 Draft Stat-
ute chose the "opting-in" alternative. 193 Thus, States must declare their
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction in a particular case; they may do so
at any time. 19 4 Declarations may be limited to certain of the crimes
referred to in article 20,195 and may be limited to particular conduct or
conduct committed during a particular period of time.196
E. Investigation, Prosecution, and Trial
The many details of the current proposal as to investigation, prosecution,
and trial will not be taken up in detail here. However, a few words on the
overall structure envisaged by the draft are in order. As the preamble and
the commentary to the Statute suggest, the Court is seen as a "facility" to
States parties and, in certain cases, to the Security Council. Thus, as
shown in Figure 5, only the Security Council and States Parties may refer
matters to or file complaints with, respectively, the Court. 19 7 To maintain
the independence of the Procuracy, the Security Council may refer mat-
ters, but not specific cases, to the Procuracy. If a Prosecutor decides not to
191. Under Article 25(2), a State Party may lodge a complaint with the Prosecutor
only as to crimes with respect to which that State accepts the Court's jurisdiction under
Article 22.
192. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 108, art. 23.
193. As discussed below, infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text, the choice of an
opting-in system is highly a controversial, and some members of the Commission
strongly objected to its inclusion at the time of the Statute's adoption. 1994 Draft Stat-
ute, supra note 7, at 83-84.
194. The only limitation is that States may not withdraw a declaration while proceed-
ings are ongoing.
195. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 22(1).
196. Id. art. 22(2), (3).
197. Id. at 89. This was the subject of debate during the last Preparatory Committee
session. Some states such as New Zealand, feel that individuals should be able to file
complaints. Others would also permit the Prosecutor to initiate Court action to avoid
States and the Security Council paralyzing the Court through their inaction. Prepara-
tory Committee, supra note 132.
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investigate a matter, or not to issue an indictment, the Presidency may,
upon request by a State or the Security Council, as appropriate, review the
decision and request (but may not order) the Prosecutor's reconsideration.
The Statute contains detailed provisions on the rights of suspects and the
accused, 198 on the form and review of the indictment,' 99 on the service of
the indictment on the accused,200 and on pretrial detention and release of
the suspect.201 Subject to certain exceptions, rules of evidence are not set
out in the Draft Statute; rather, the judges are to make rules for the func-
tioning of the Court, including its procedure and evidence. 20 2
Unlike the IMT Charter, but like the ICTY Statute, the 1994 Draft Stat-
ute provides that, as a general rule, the accused should be present during
the trial, subject to narrow exceptions. 203 The Statute does permit the con-
stitution of an Indictment Chamber if a trial may not be held because an
accused deliberately absents himself. The purpose of the proceeding is to
record the evidence, consider whether the evidence establishes a prima
facie case of a crime within the court's jurisdiction, and, if so, to issue and
publish a warrant of arrest against the suspect.204 The Statute is silent as
to whether the Indictment Chamber's hearing will be public or private,
however, the commentary suggests that the drafters had in mind a public
hearing that, in the case an "international arrest warrant," would render
the accused "in a certain sense a fugitive from international justice."205
This is consistent with article 38(4) which provides that trials under the
Statute will be public, unless privacy is required to protect the accused,
victims, and witnesses,20 6 or to protect confidential or sensitive informa-
198. See, e.g., 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 26(6). Article 37 requires that
trials occur in the presence of the accused, unless certain exceptions are present. See
also article 40 (presumption of innocence), art. 41 (rights of the accused, including the
right to be informed of the charge in a language which he understands, to a trial "with-
out undue delay," to have adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence, to legal
assistance, to communicate with counsel, and not to be compelled to testify or to confess
guilt).
199. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 27. Under article 38(1)(a), indictments will
not be public until the beginning of the trial, or as the result of a decision of an Indict-
ment Chamber in the special circumstances envisaged by article 37(4). Id. at 96.
200. Id. art. 30.
201. Id. art. 29.
202. Id. art. 19(1)(b). But see itd. art. 44, concerning evidentiary oaths, judicial notice
of facts, and an exclusionary rule providing that evidence obtained by means of a "seri-
ous violation" of the Statute or "other rules of international law" is not admissible. The
Statute also provides that the Prosecutor may request states to make qualified and
experienced personnel available to the Prosecutor to assist in a prosecution, id. art. 31.
Otherwise, it does not contain very detailed provisions on the functioning of the
Procuracy for which it has been criticized. However, the 1994 Draft is certainly an
improvement over the 1951 and 1953 texts, which provided only for an ad hoc prosecu-
tor who would be selected on a case by case basis, and in the case of the 1953 Draft,
presumably paid by the complainant state. See supra notes 91-92 and 108-109 and
accompanying text.
203. Id. art. 37. Compare IMT Charter, supra note 50, and the ICTY Statute, supra
note 3, art. 20(2).
204. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 37(4).
205. Id. at 109.
206. Id. arts. 38(4), 43.
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tion to be given in evidence.
Two important principles protecting the accused that are enshrined in
the current draft are the principle of legality (nullum poena sine lege)20 7 and
the principle of non bis in idem (more familiarly known in this country as
the principle of double jeopardy). 20° The inclusion of both principles in
the Draft Statute is a significant improvement over many earlier proposals
for an International Criminal Court. Of course, their content is still the
subject of extensive debate, and many suggestions for modification of the
language currently proposed have been made.209
207. Id. art. 39. Article 39 provides, somewhat laconically, that an accused shall not
be held guilty in the case of a prosecution based on articles 20(a) through (d), "unless
the act or omission in question constituted a crime under international law." This of
course begs the question of what acts are considered crimes under international law,
presumably leaving this issue to the Trial Chambers to decide, subject to review on
appeal. The commentary suggests that there may be cases in which "an individual could
be convicted for a crime under international law in an international court although the
same person could not be tried in a national court." Id. at 113-14. The commentary
adds that these cases will be "rare." Id. at 114. In fact, such cases are likely to be quite
common. Many countries have no mechanism by which to incorporate international
crimes in their municipal law (or have a mechanism which is little used). In the case of
prosecutions for Treaty Crimes, the principle, according to article 39(b) requires that
"the treaty in question was applicable to the conduct of the accused." As a result, the
comments suggest that if a national of State A commits a crime, and State A is not a
party to the Treaty in question, he may not be prosecuted if he commits the crime on
State A's territory, but he may be prosecuted if he commits the Crime on State X's terri-
tory, if State X is a party to the Treaty. Id. art. 39(b).
208. Id. art. 42. This provision draws heavily on article 10 of the ICTY Statute, with
modifications designed to accommodate the possibility that trial might occur in another
international court or tribunal. Id. at 117. The provision is intended to cover the effect
of prior trials whether by another court or the proposed International Criminal Court; it
is also intended to state the effect that another court should accord trial by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The prohibition only attaches where "the first court actually
exercised jurisdiction and made a determination on the merits with respect to the partic-
ular acts constituting the crime, and where there was a sufficient measure of identity
between the crimes which were the subject of the successive trials." Id. at 118.
209. See the modifications proposed in the Preparatory Committee Sessions, Prepara-
tory Committee Summary, First Session, supra note 9, at 73-94.
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F. Judgment, Appeal, and Revision
The processes of trial, appeal, and revision are outlined in Figures 6 and 7,
below. Notably, all judgments of the Court, whether Trial or Appellate, are
to be issued without dissents or separate opinions,2 10 unlike the judg-
ments of the ICTY and ICTR. 21 1 The Court is not authorized to impose the
death penalty,2 12 nor is it authorized to order restitution or reparation for
victims. 21 3
Following a judgment of acquittal or conviction, the Draft Statute
implements the right of appeal generally guaranteed by most legal systems
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 14 although,
curiously, it implements this "right" for both the Prosecutor and the
Defendant. 2 15 It is not contemplated that the Appeals Chamber will con-
duct a new trial, although according to the commentary, it "has all the
powers of a Trial Chamber."216 Rather, it is assumed that it will rely upon
the transcript of the trial proceedings. 21 7 Although it is not completely
clear what is envisaged from the proposed language, it appears that the
Appeals Chamber will be able to consider questions of law and fact
equally, giving it, in the words of the drafters "some of the functions of
appel in civil law systems" and "some of the functions of cassation."2 18 As
shown in Figure 7, the revision of a judgment of conviction is also possible
if new evidence is discovered that was not available to the applicant at the
time the judgment was pronounced or affirmed and which could have been
a decisive factor in the conviction. 219
G. International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Because the proposed International Criminal Court will have no enforce-
210. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, arts. 45(5), 49(4). The language of the Draft is a
bit untidy in that it clearly refers to the "sole" judgment of the Trial Chamber, but refers
only to "The decision" of the Appeals Chamber. The comment to article 49, however,
indicates the drafters' intent to have the same rule for Trial and Appellate decisions. Id.
at 127.
211. ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 23(2).
212. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 124.
213. It was thought that this might interfere with the Court's primary function,
"namely to prosecute and punish without delay perpetrators of the crimes referred to in
the Statute." Id. at 124. Similarly, the idea of "community service" was rejected as
"entirely inappropriate" by some members, given that the Court would only deal with
the most egregious of offenses. Id. at 125.
214. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14(5),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
215. Thus, under article 48, a Prosecutor may appeal an acquittal (the only remedy
being retrial, art. 49(b)). Under article 50, however, the Prosecutor may not ask for the
revision of an acquittal. The drafters do not satisfactorily explain why it violates the non
bis in idem prohibition for the prosecutor to ask for revision of an acquittal on the basis
that new evidence has come forward that would have changed the result, but does not
violate it if the prosecutor requests a retrial based on an error of law or fact (or a dispro-
portionate sentence) on appeal.
216. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 126.
217. Id. at 127.
218. Id.
219. Id. art. 50.
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ment organ,220 it is largely dependent on States Parties for assistance with
respect to the investigation of offenses, the arrest of suspects, the location
and procurement of evidence and witnesses, and the enforcement and rec-
220. Unlike the version proposed in 1943 by the London International Assembly,
which would have given the International Criminal Court its own constabulary. See
supra note 41.
I
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ognition of its judgments. Article 51 states this obligation in imperative
terms, providing that "States parties shall cooperate with the Court in con-
nection with criminal investigations and proceedings under this Stat-
ute."22' Thus, the Registrar is permitted to request State cooperation and
221. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 51.
Appeal and Review of ConvictionJudgment of Conviction and Se tence
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judicial assistance with respect to a wide variety of specifically enumerated
measures including the identification and location of persons; the taking of
testimony and production of evidence; the service of documents; and the
arrest or detention of persons. 222
Article 51 also contains a "catch-all" provision, permitting the Regis-
trar to request any assistance "which may facilitate the administration of
justice" (presumably as defined by the Court), including provisional meas-
ures taken to prevent an accused from leaving its territory or the destruc-
tion of evidence there. 223 Article 51(3), however, limits the obligation of
States parties to comply with a request from the Court to cases in which
they have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in
question, except in cases where the prosecution was based on genocide
(art. 21(1)(a)), in which case they must comply "without undue delay."
Given the complex State consent regime envisaged by Article 22,224 this is
likely to render the State assistance provision difficult to understand and
to enforce. The language is also perhaps imprecise, in that it does not
address a situation (which is highly likely to occur if the indictments
issued by the IMT, the ICTY, and the ICTR are any example) in which an
indictment contains several counts, some of which are within a State's
jurisdictional declaration, others not. This limitation is not present in arti-
cle 52 (on provisional measures), but then again, article 52, unlike article
51, is not phrased in terms of the obligation of the State to comply, but
rather the power of the Court to request. 225
As Figure 8 shows, States are also required, under certain circum-
stances, to arrest an accused and transfer him to the Court. Again, States
Parties, other than in cases involving genocide, only have this obligation if
they have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crime in
question.226 This "obligation" however, is qualified, because, unlike the
ICTY, the 1994 Draft Statute is not based on the principle of primacy over
national courts, 227 but is merely a facility for States parties (i.e., it envis-
ages a system of concurrent jurisdiction). In fact, article 53 sets out a
series of options for States receiving an arrest and transfer request under
article 53.228 It contains a separate regime for arrests depending on
222. Id. art. 51(2)(a)-(d).
223. Id. at 131, art. 51(2)(e), art. 52.
224. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
225. This reading of the article is confirmed by the Commentary which suggests that
"[a]rtide 52 is essentially an empowering provision so far as the Court is concerned."
1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 131.
226. Id. art. 53(2). Note that this obligation only applies after confirmation of the
indictment by the Presidency pursuant to article 27 (See Figure 5, supra), but does not
apply to the provisional arrest of a suspect under art. 28(1), which is governed by article
52(1)(a). Presumably however, States Parties nevertheless have an obligation to cooper-
ate with the Court in as regards provisional measures pursuant to article 5 1(1) and (2),
which refer specifically to provisional measures, arrest and detention.
227. See ICTY Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(2).
228. Some members of the Commission felt that even this system went "too far in the
direction of giving priority to the Court's jurisdiction as compared with that of a State
requesting extradition: they stressed that the Court should in no case interfere with
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whether the jurisdiction of the Court is premised on a treaty crime (article
20(e)) or one of the other crimes listed in article 20.
H. Enforcement
Article 58 provides that States Parties undertake to recognize the judg-
ments of the Court.229 Article 59 provides that sentences shall be served in
State prisons, a necessary detail, for at least in the initial stages of the
Court's existence, its institutional structure will not include a prison facil-
ity.230 Finally, article 60 on pardon, parole, and commutation of
sentences imposes an interesting legal regime which combines interna-
tional and municipal law. Prisoners may apply to the Court for pardon,
parole or commutation of sentence, if "under a generally applicable law of
the State of imprisonment, a person in the same circumstances who had
been convicted for the same conduct" by a domestic court of that State
would be eligible for such relief.23 ' If the application for relief appears to
be well-founded, the Presidency may convene a Chamber to rule upon it.
III. An Assessment of the Proposed Text
A. Why an International Criminal Court Should Be Established
How one evaluates the proposed Court depends upon what one thinks it
ought to do. To some extent, the purpose of a permanent international
criminal court differs depending upon who one asks. But, there is proba-
bly general agreement on some basic propositions. First, over the last fifty
years, the corpus of international instruments defining and codifying inter-
national criminal law has increased dramatically. According to one study,
as of May 1996 some 315 international instruments addressing twenty-four
categories of either international or transnational crimes had been entered
into by States.232 The crimes identified fall roughly into two groups:
extremely serious crimes (in terms of their gravity, their widespread
nature, or both) which offend a fundamental interest of the international
community, and crimes of lesser magnitude with a significant transna-
existing and functioning extradition agreements." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at
134. Article 54 complements article 53 by imposing an aut dedere autjudicare obligation
in the case of treaty crimes in cases in which a State is a party to the Statute and the
treaty in question, but does not consent to the Court's jurisdiction over that crime. Id.
cmt.
229. Id. art. 58.
230. Id. art. 59, cmt. The Commentary also points out that the Statute is silent on
how the expenses of incarceration are to be shared, stating that "[t]his will need to be
worked out as part of the financial structure of the Statute." Id. at 140.
231. Id. art. 60(1).
232. JORDON PAUST, M. CHERF BAssiouul, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRImiNAL LAW CASES
AND MARIALS 11 (1996). Not all commentators agree, however, on the extent to which
each of these instruments, and the customary international criminal law that has devel-
oped, particularly since Nuremberg, actually covers particular offenses. As one com-
mentator put it, there is a range of overlapping international and national crimes, and
yet there is some doubt as to whether "some of the most serious conduct [is] criminal by
international law at all." Current Developments, International Criminal Law, 48 INT'L L.
Q. 467 (1995).
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tional component. One may debate which crimes belong in which group,
but the growing number of legal instruments suggests that along with the
positive effects of "globalization" such as increased trade, there have been
some very nasty side effects. It also suggests a growing awareness that
each of us is a member of an international as well as a local and national
community?23 3 Even where changes in technology have not brought about
233. Professor Mueller believes that this is the "inevitable evolution toward the recog-
nition of a civitas maxima, the ultimate community.... Perhaps little has changed since
1996 International Criminal Court
increased crime, they have shown us its effects: images of starving chil-
dren, hijacked or sabotaged aircraft, homeless refugees, and bombed cities
appear on television screens around the world no matter where the crisis is
to be found.
Yet, neither the increase in legal instruments prohibiting international
crime nor our heightened awareness of its consequences has served to
bring about the effective enforcement of international criminal law.
Indeed, the more hideous and large-scale the offense, the less likely it is to
be punished. 234 This is unfortunately not surprising, for nations are often
ill-equipped and generally indisposed to prosecute international crimes.
As to crimes not committed by a country's nationals or on its territory,
often either the statutory authorization to prosecute is lacking, or, if pres-
ent, is deficient in some manner. Witness, for example, the implementa-
tion of the Genocide Convention by the United States, which limits
potential prosecutions to cases in which the offense was committed in the
United States or the alleged offender is a United States national. 235 Even if
a country's laws permit prosecution, there may be serious problems in
obtaining the presence of the accused, and, frankly, little incentive to
spend time and money prosecuting individuals who have committed
offenses in another country. This has recently been demonstrated by the
lack of enthusiasm French prosecutors have shown in pursuing Rwandans
present in France for crimes against humanity they allegedly committed
during the recent conflagration in that country, in spite of the fact that
recent French legislation providing for the prosecution of such offenses
clearly applies. 236 It is also apparent in IFOR's refusal to arrest Bosnian
Serb war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. 2 3 7
As for the criminal justice system in a country where international
crimes are occurring, it may very well be paralyzed by the criminal activity
and incapable of reacting. Worse yet, prosecutors and judges may be con-
trolled by or become puppets of a government engaging in criminal behav-
earliest recorded history: the jurisdictional unit is still the village, except that the village
is now the world." Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Four Decades After Nuremberg: The Prospect
of an International Criminal Code, 2 CONN.J. INV'L L. 499, 506-07 (1987). See infra notes
253-258 and accompanying text.
234. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. Indeed, as Professor Meron recently
observed, the atrocities committed by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and the use of
poison gas against the Kurds in Iran are among the many crimes left unpunished either
by national or international courts. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of
Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INTL L. 554, 554 (1995). See also Blakesley, supra note 2, at
79.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1994). Although the Genocide Convention does not
require the United States to do more, other countries have. See, e.g., CODE PENAL [C.
PfN.] art. 211-1 (Fr.).
236. See Wexler, supra note 22, at 366 (discussing the new French law on crimes
against humanity). A country might see the prosecution of international drug traffickers
or hijackers, as more in its self-interest, however, particularly if harm is occurring within
that country or to that nation's citizens as a result of the offender's international crimi-
nal activities. An example is United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
237. Anthony Lewis, They See Karadzfc and Pretend Not to Notice, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 29, 1996, at 10.
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ior. Certainly this is the case when conflict erupts; this has also proven to
be true, to a certain degree, in handling narcoterrorists. Indeed, this is the
very reason why the Caribbean nations urged the General Assembly to re-
examine the then defunct international criminal court project in the first
place. 238
Finally, domestic courts and prosecutors lack experience in interna-
tional law and often interpret international instruments in a manner which
is contrary to the express or implied intent of the treaty or convention in
question.239 They are also subject to national politics. Thus, they are
often poor vehicles for the prosecution of their own nationals, as was
graphically demonstrated by the Touvier case in France.240 Touvier,
accused of participating in the murder of seven Jews during the Nazi occu-
pation of World War II recently died in jail. His case took more than
twenty years to wind its way through the French courts, and many sus-
pected interference by the executive branch. This was confirmed when the
late Frangois Mitterand, formerly President of France, announced that he
had in fact interfered with the pursuit of Vichy collaborators because he
believed that the prosecutions would be divisive. 241 National courts may
also be poor venues for the trial of foreigners, who they may have difficulty
treating fairly.
Thus the rationale for an international criminal court is at least in
part, as the International Law Commission has recognized, the need for an
international trial court for the prosecution and suppression of the most
serious crimes of international concern in cases in which national trials
would not occur or would be ineffective, 242 and in particular243 for a per-
238. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2576-77 (1993)
(Court divided over the meaning of the term refouler in the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992) (holding that, notwithstanding the presence of an extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico, a Mexican national could be tried in the United States even
where he had been kidnapped from Mexico and the Mexican government had protested
the kidnapping and subsequent prosecution). For criticism of the United States' courts
approach to the application of international law, see David J. Bederman, Revivalist
Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1994); Martin A. Rogoff, Inter-
pretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of International
Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 559 (1996); Detlev F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretations and the
New American Ways of Law Reading, 4 EuRL J. Ir''L L. 472 (1993); Wexler, Nuremberg
Principles, supra note 22, at 363 n.328.
240. Wexler, Nuremberg Principles, supra note 22.
241. Id. at 316-66.
242. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, pmbl., cmt. The United States proposed, in its
comments to the Draft Code of Crimes, that, in its view, "the most effective response to
the problem of international crime is to strengthen cooperation among Governments in
the investigation and prosecution of those committing criminal acts." Comments and
Observations, supra note 119, at 95-96. While certainly this will assist in national prose-
cutions of international crimes, it will only do so in cases in which national govern-
ments are willing and able to act. There still remains a large category of offenses for
which there will be no prosecutions at all if there is no international criminal court.
One point suggested by the above discussion is that different nations may, at different
times, have different needs with respect to an international criminal court. While all
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manent court to try those responsible of serious violations of international
humanitarian law. It is also, perhaps secondarily, an argument for a court
which, like the International Court of Justice, could help interpret and
develop international criminal law, either through an original or advisory
jurisdiction.244
Given the inadequacy of national criminal justice systems in the face
of massive violations of international humanitarian law, one alternative is
to do nothing. Some have suggested that this is the only alternative, given
the fragmented "legal and political nature of the international commu-
nity."245 But doing nothing has both moral and practical costs. As Jose
Avala Lasso, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
recently remarked, it is an "obscenity" that "a person stands a better
chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being than for
killing 100,000."246 Practically speaking, the cost of killings, bombings,
and terrorism, in terms of loss of life, loss of human potential, economic
destruction, and wasted resources is enormous. There are undoubted risks
in using criminal trials to achieve social justice and attempt to right socie-
tal wrongs that have occurred on a massive scale. The debate whether legal
prosecution or some other method, such as lustration, or South Africa's
ongoing experiment with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 247 is a
nations should wish for the prosecution of genocide wherever and whenever it occurs
(hence the appropriateness of the International Law Commission's proposal for the
Court's inherent jurisdiction over genocide); other countries may need more assistance
with crimes such as narco-terrorism or hijacking.
243. Some States believe that the Court's jurisdiction should include only serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Others feel it should cover transnational
criminal activity such as narcotics traffic and terrorism. See infra Part III.B.6.
244. Indeed, when the ILC resumed work on the question of international criminal
court in 1989, it considered models that would have responded to one or both of these
needs. The report suggested three alternative models for the International Criminal
Court: an ICC with exclusive jurisdiction; concurrent jurisdiction between the ICC and
national courts; or an ICC having only review power (this could include advisory opin-
ions requested by a UN organ, or binding opinions requested by a state, which would
allow the Court to harmonize the interpretation of international criminal law, leaving to
national tribunals the function of deciding on the merits). Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its Forty-second session, supra note 114, at 24-25. It was
only later that the scope of the Court's power was reduced, in response to political con-
cerns. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
245. Warbrick, supra note 5, at 261. See also Rubin, supra note 2, at 7.
246. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Bulletin, No. 8, 19-VII-
1996, at 1.
247. In July 1995, Nelson Mandela signed legislation establishing a Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission. The Commission is empowered to issue subpoenas for the sake of
gathering information, but it has no prosecutorial function. It is, however, authorized to
grant amnesty to all who come forward and describe their actions, assuming they fulfill
the criteria for amnesty. The Commission, headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, con-
sists of three committees: the first conducts investigations, the second issues amnesties,
and the third determines what reparations the government ought to make to the victims.
Naturally enough, there is widespread doubt that the Commission can be both effective
and impartial. Suzanne Daley, Panel to Investigate Atrocities of the Apartheid Era, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at A3. Early on families of victims challenged the amnesty power,
charging violation of victim's rights. Suzanne Daley, Victim's Kin Sue to Halt Apartheid-
Era Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at A5. However, South Africa's top Court dis-
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better vehicle to promote national reconciliation (at least enough to permit
the reestablishment of coexistence without warfare) is ongoing and space
does not permit its full exploration here.248 But legal accountability, if
consistently enforced, would surely bring about much of the good on an
international scale that it may domestically, such as deterrence of crime,
rehabilitation of the victim's dignity, retribution for the criminal act, and
upholding of the principles of justice and law.2 49
Another alternative is to create ad-hoc tribunals. Certainly this per-
mits States and the Security Council a certain flexibility in addressing par-
ticular crises. But as others have observed, several problems attend the
creation of ad hoc tribunals. 250 As the criticisms of the IMT at Nuremberg
show, ad-hoc tribunals give the impression of arbitrary and selective prose-
cution, no matter how "fair" the actual trial proceedings are. This has been
true of the ICTY and ICTR, where both defendants and commentators have
raised the issue of the tribunals' legitimacy, pointing out that their creation
depended on action by the Security Council, an inherently political
organ.2 5 1
Second, there is the problem of delay. Ad hoc tribunals represent a
post hoc mechanism that takes time to establish-time during which evi-
dence may be destroyed and additional lives lost. A permanent tribunal
would arguably provide the international community with an existing
mechanism that can promptly investigate and prosecute reported war
crimes and other atrocities.
missed these challenges, ruling that without the amnesty program, the truth about what
happened during the apartheid years might never be told. Suzanne Daley, Pardon Us,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1996, at D2.
248. See Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability,
and the Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & Soc. INQ. 7, 24 (1995); MarkJ. Osiel, Ever Again:
Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. R-v. 463 (1995). Professor
Osiel discusses the extent to which law can address the aftermath of what he terms
"administrative massacre," that is, "large-scale violation of basic human rights to life and
liberty by the central state in a systematic and organized fashion, often against its own
citizens, generally in a climate of war-civil or international, real or imagined." Id. at
468.
249. See, e.g., Alti Rodal, The Role of Historical Inquiry in Creating Accountability for
Human Rights Abuses, 12 B.C. THiRu WoRuD L. J. 269, 279-80 (1992) (concerning the
need for Nazi War Crimes trials); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2542 (1991);
Wexler, Reflections, supra note 59.
250. Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for a Permanent War Crimes Court, CHRISAN Sci.
MoNrroR, Aug. 16, 1995, at 19.
251. Of course, the ICTY and ICTR, unlike the IMT at Nuremberg (and Tokyo), are
not military tribunals but were established by Security Council Resolution. Moreover,
the judges are not only nationals of victorious powers passing judgment on the van-
quished; the eleven judges on the ICTY, for example come from many different nations.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Bulletin, January 1996, at 3.
But as has been argued elsewhere, the creation of a tribunal in such a manner is
nondemocratic in that it denies most states "a vote" on the Court's establishment, and
sidesteps the right of nations to engage in a debate about their cession of sovereignty.
Blakesley, supra note 6, at 181.
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Finally, and perhaps most critically, there is no way to build institu-
tional memory and competence with ad hoc tribunals. In each case, prose-
cutors must be found, staff assembled and trained, and judges procured
who are willing and able to leave their existing commitments (and who
may have little or no experience in international criminal law). This may
impact not only on the capacity of the ad hoc court to conduct an effective
prosecution and trial, but also on the rights of the defendant, given the
inexperience and certain zeal of those pursuing him and sitting in judg-
ment upon him.
Even if the case for the existence of an international criminal court is
strong in theory, it may still be weak in practice. This article will not dis-
cuss the political objections to an international criminal court, for it goes
without saying that if nations are unable to agree on its creation, the 1994
Draft Statute, like its many predecessors will not be implemented until
such time as political agreement is present (or not, as the case may be).
Moreover, it is at least arguable that the political winds are currently more
favorable than they were in the past.252 As to the other objections that have
historically been raised to the creation of such a court, each will be briefly
addressed below.
1. State Sovereignty
Once rigidly defined and raised as an absolute bar to the creation of an
international criminal court, it is now clear that, at least in theory, this
ought not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court.253 Indeed, international law scholars have begun to
express cautious optimism about the evolution of international law from
its origins as a rather primitive "law of nations" governing certain limited
aspects of inter-State relations,254 to a complex normative system 255 that is
"becoming the law of a planetary community of which all human beings
are members."256
252. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
253. The creation of the IMT at Nuremberg and the creation of the European Union
are practical examples of cessions of State sovereignty. But see supra notes 61, 70.
254. This theory was articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the Lotus case. There the Court stated that "[i]nternational Law governs relations
between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will." S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. V. Turk.) 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7) at 6. But as commentators have often noted, this view is illogical, for States
constantly enter into treaties which limit their freedom of action.
255. ROSLYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LA-v AND How WE USE
IT 1 (1994).
256. M. CHERiF BAssIouN & EDWARD M. WISE, ATrr DEDam , AUTJUDICARE THE DUtY
To ExTRADITE OR PROSECUr IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ix (1995). Accompanying the notion
that there is a complex normative system that one might call international law that goes
well beyond inter-State relations, is the corollary that the old system premised on the
principle of state sovereignty is now ddmodd. Just as other entities, such as individuals,
have become the creators of international law, they may be constrained by international
legal norms which are binding upon them. The new "international law" has, like
national legal systems, many components, some created by the transnational activities
individuals and aggregates of individuals; some created by intergovernmental entities;
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Of course, "[s]overeignty is a powerful idea. No matter how hard theo-
rists have tried to deconstruct or decompose it or to diminish it by treating
it as a relative concept, the ideas and feelings expressed by the term 'sover-
eignty' continue to exercise a strong influence on contemporary political
and legal thinking."257 Moreover, States still maintain formal adherence to
principles of sovereignty, and in particular, may raise political objections to
its erosion.258 Thus arguments of sovereignty may serve as an effective
political, if not legal, bar to the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court. This is particularly true given that, as one author has
astutely remarked, once such a Court is established it is more than likely to
expand its own jurisdiction at the expense of State sovereignty. 25 9
2. Effectiveness and Deterrence
It can, of course, be argued that the Court will be of no use in deterring
international crime, although I do not think many would agree that it
would make matters worse, as Sir Graham Bower argued in 1926.260 At
least one person has argued that the existence of the Tribunal could send
"the message that, once a country engages in war it must do anything at all
to eliminate the evidence of war crimes."261 Given the number of atrocities
that are currently taking place, without any prosecution whatsoever, one
could argue that the court should be given a try if it has any chance of
success at all.
Moreover, it has been persuasively argued elsewhere that the best way
to prevent "recurrence of genocide and other forms of state-sponsored
mass brutality, is to cultivate a shared and enduring memory of its hor-
rors-and to employ the law self-consciously toward this end."'262 Admit-
some created by what one author recently dubbed "transnational governmental institu-
tions," Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L. L. 503 (1995); and finally, some created by the inter-State relations normally asso-
ciated with the growth and practice of international law.
257. Rogoff, supra note 239, at 623. Rogoff points out that legal paradigms can and
do shift over time in response to changing economic, political, psychological and social
realities. Id. at 640-55. He argues that the cooperation of national courts may be essen-
tial to such a development, particularly through their membership in an epistemic "inter-
national" legal community. Id. at 674-75.
258. Thus there are still large pockets of international law that remain largely gov-
erned by the inter-State relations paradigm, either for practical or juridical reasons. BAs-
siou i & Wise, supra note 256, at ix. The draft Statute for the proposed International
Criminal Court contains many elements of this complex and often contradictory norma-
tive system. Individuals, not states, will be the defendants before the proposed Interna-
tional Criminal Court, but States will establish the Court by multi-lateral treaty.
259. Blakesley, supra note 2, at 79. Given the scheme of complementarity proposed
by the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, however, where there is an emphasis on concurrent,
rather than exclusive, jurisdiction, this appears a less likely prospect than the expansion
of the European Court of Justice's jurisdiction and that of the United States Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, the point is well-taken.
260. See supra notes 36 and 40 and accompanying text.
261. Blakesley, supra note 2, at 81.
262. Osiel, supra note 248, at 466. Professor Osiel does not explicitly endorse this
view. But in writing of the use of (domestic) criminal trials to address administrative
massacre, he writes:
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tedly the proposed Court will depend on State cooperation for the
execution of arrest warrants and other forms of enforcement, and the lack
of an enforcement arm may indeed prove fatal if State's refuse their assist-
ance. Arguably, however, the uncooperativeness of States should not be
assumed.
3. Complexity
The endless drafts and long debates on the topic suggest that the problem
of an international criminal court's creation is so complex as to be intracta-
ble. However, as Doudou Thiam acerbicly remarked, objections based on
complexity "instead of pointing to a technical snag .... seem to reflect a
lack of political will."26 3 The Treaty of Rome establishing the European
Economic Community with over 200 articles was drafted and signed in less
than one year, and ratified quickly thereafter. 264 It is true that the criminal
justice systems of different countries are each delicately balanced to ensure
that the interests of both the accused and the State are represented. Merger
of these systems into an "amalgamated whole" certainly represents a con-
siderable effort.265 The difficulty of this effort should not, however, be
overstated.266
Some American authors have raised questions regarding the appropri-
ateness, or even the constitutionality, of United States' participation in an
international criminal court should the Court's statute not guarantee all
the rights found in our Bill of Rights (and the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence thereon).267 These are serious questions, and any statute must at a
minimum provide protections for the accused. Yet, it is important to recall
that our system is neither completely fair nor in compliance with interna-
tional human rights standards (particularly in imposing the death pen-
In the deeply divided societies where administrative massacre occurs, it is too
much to hope ... that, through criminal law, judges can easily elicit shared
sentiments of liberal morality in ways that all will endorse.
But it is not too much to hope that courts might make full use of the public
spotlight trained upon them at such times to stimulate democratic deliberation
about the merits and meaning of such principles. In the ensuing debate, with
the recent memory of official intolerance and repression firmly in everyone's
minds, liberal morality will do very well on its own. That debate can signally
contribute to the special sort of solidarity-through civil dissensus-to which a
modem pluralistic society may properly aspire.
Id. at 286-87.
263. Tenth Thiam Report, supra note 114, cl 16. As he pointed out, most of the issues
are "no more complex" than those involved in the "establishment of other international
judicial organs such as the International Court of Justice and European Court of Human
Rights" (and, one might add, the European Court of Justice). Id.
264. GEORGE A. BERmANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERLUS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
7 (1992). Of course, there were only six signatory states. But the complexity of the legal
issues involved, not to mention the cession of sovereignty, were surely greater than what
is involved in establishing an International Criminal Court.
265. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
266. See American Bar Association Task Force on a International Criminal Court, 28
INT'L LAW. 475 (1994).
267. Blakesley, supra note 2, at 100-01; Finch, supra note 98.
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alty),268 nor is the Constitution the bar that is often posited. Indeed, the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights were only applied to the States through the
process of selective incorporation by the Supreme Court. It is difficult to
see how the same process could apply extraterritorially to proceedings con-
ducted by an international criminal tribunal, so as to bar United States'
participation in a multilateral treaty to create an International Criminal
Court.269 But even if one were to do so, which rights would apply? On
what criteria would their selection be based?270
4. Counterproductiveness
The claim is often made that if an International Criminal Court is created
and does not work, international law and justice will be set back decades.
The "legislative history" (ILC reports, 6th Committee discussions, etc.) of
the effort to establish an International Criminal Court are replete with this
argument which is often framed that it is better to "be realistic" and do
nothing than to do something that might not work.271 Yet, international
criminal law, and particularly international humanitarian law, as it cur-
rently stands is incoherent, incomplete, and practically not enforced. It is
not clear why it would be worse if the international community attempted
prosecutions and failed because politics intervened-a country failed to
hand over the accused, a superpower refused to contribute its share to the
Court's operations, or a State refused the Court's jurisdiction. Reading
between the lines, the real fear of most democratic governments concern-
ing the international criminal court is not that it will fail, but that it will
succeed. That is, that there will be established an institution independent
enough to hold governments (including superpower governments) account-
able. Given the proposed structure of the Court, that is probably not a
possibility. But even were it possible, is this not something from which
every citizen could benefit (assuming that the Court was insulated enough
from political processes so that its own proceedings would not be trivial,
politically motivated, or a sham, of course).
268. See the Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Series A) (1989), 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439
(1989), 28 l.L.M. 1063 (1989).
269. The recent increase in international agreements entered into by the United States
has clearly placed a strain on the constitutional structure envisaged by the framers. For
example, as Professors Ackerman and Golove suggest in their recent article, the twenti-
eth century has seen a remarkable shift in which the Treaty clause, once supreme and
capable of defeating the United States' entry into the League of Nations and ratification
of the Treaty of Versailles, has become prey to Congressional-Executive agreements such
as NAFTA. Professors Ackerman and Golove argue that this transformation is both con-
stitutional and appropriate. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 HaRv. L. REv. 801, 803, 916-29 (1995). Professor Tribe disagrees, arguing that such
liberal constitutional interpretation threatens to weaken the Constitution. Laurence
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1227 (1995).
270. For a thoughtful analysis of this problem, see Marquardt, supra note 2, at 79
(concluding that the proposed court "easily passes muster under familiar principles of
United States law").
271. See, e.g., supra notes 77, 99, 114, and accompanying text.
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5. Absence of International Criminal Law
One of the most serious criticisms levelled at efforts to create an Interna-
tional Criminal Court is the absence of a well-defined corpus of "positive"
international criminal law. This charge was raised after World War Two, at
the IMT at Nuremberg,272 and has been a repeated theme of the debate on
an International Criminal Court. It is, of course, resurfacing with respect
to the ICTY and ICTR.
The situation today is quite different than that which existed fifty
years ago. Treaties defining international crimes now abound, although
there are some glaring omissions, such as crimes against humanity.27 3
The problem with many of them is their lack of precision. Even the geno-
cide convention, which specifically contemplated enforcement, contains no
section on penalties, mens rea, or defenses. Some have looked to the Inter-
national Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind as the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, the
Draft Code has encountered serious resistance from States and although
the ILC recently adopted a new version of it,274 it appears to be shelved for
the time being.27 5 Others have suggested that it will be the Court itself
who will solve these definitional problems by developing an international
criminal "common" law.27 6 Query, however, whether such a common law
approach is consistent with modern notions of legality.2 77
In its 1994 Draft Statute, the ILC opted for a provision on jurisdiction
which did not explicitly define the crimes under general international law
272. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
273. Crimes against humanity are considered part of customary international law.
These crimes were defined, each time slightly differently, in Article 6(c) of the IMT Char-
ter, in art. 5 of the ICTY Statute, and art. 3 of the ICTR Statute. Due to the ambiguities
concerning its exact nature, calls have issued for its "codification" by international
treaty. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized Con-
vention, 31 CoLmt. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994).
274. International Law Commission, Draft code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission at its forth-eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/Cn.4/L.532 (1996).
275. Although the latest version addresses some of the controversial provisions of the
1991 Draft, it does not grapple with many of the issues raised, and appears no more
likely to garner the support of a majority of States.
276. See supra note 38.
277. As Professor Edward Wise has noted, the classic formulation of the principle of
legality is the maxim nullum crimen nullum poena sine lege. As he notes, "[a]lmost every-
where (and nowadays, to a large extent, even in countries following English common
law), the principle of legality has been taken to require that crimes be specifically pro-
scribed by law in advance of the conduct sought to be punished." E. M. Wise, IL.A.
Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court, Report on General Rules of Law,
December 27, 1996 draft, at 80. Although it is clear that this does not, as a matter of
international law, prohibit prosecutions based on customary international law (see art.
15, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), "there seems to be emerging
broad agreement that not only offense definitions and penalties, but also the general
rules of liability and exoneration to be applied by the court, cannot be left to national
law, or otherwise permitted to vary from case to case, but must be settled in advance."
Id. at 83. But seeJordanJ. Paust, Report Prepared for the LL.A Committee on a Permanent
International Criminal Court, Nullum Crimen and Related Claims, December 27, 1996
draft, at 96.
Cornell International Law Journal
in subparagraphs (a) through (d), but maintained the Court's statute as a
"primarily... adjectival and procedural instrument."278 Thus, the Com-
mission essentially decided the issue without deciding it, determining, as
would be the case in most national legal systems, that the Court's Statute is
not the place to define substantive criminal law.
Many studies of the Draft, and in particular the Siracusa Draft have
proposed extensive changes to the Draft Statute which would define the law
to be applied by the Court.279 The Working Groups on the Definition of
Crimes and General Principles of Criminal Law and Penalties at the Pre-
paratory Committee sessions have produced draft definitions of crimes to
be included in the Draft Statute as well as general principles of criminal
law and penalties. 280 Query whether a consensus can be reached on all the
issues before the delegates within a reasonable time period, given the fail-
ure, until now, of the Draft Code.
B. Particular Problems with the 1994 Draft Statute
Given these general considerations, how are they addressed by the 1994
Draft Statute. Certainly the statement of the Court's purpose and overall
thrust is appropriate. The Court will serve as a trial court for serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, in cases in
which national prosecutions would not occur (or would be ineffective).
Thus far, the Commission's approach seems perfectly consistent with the
goals of the proposed International Criminal Court. But there are certain
institutional features of the Court which, unfortunately, seriously threaten
its ability to function effectively. This Article will not attempt to address all
the problems raised by the ILC's draft, but will highlight a few of the more
egregious ones.
1. Compensation and Tenure of the Judiciary
To a large extent, the success or failure of the Court will rest on the caliber
of its judges and their ability to work together. There are several features of
the judiciary contemplated by the 1994 Draft Statute that threaten the
Court's ability to function properly. First, as contemplated by the 1994
Draft Statute, judges will not be eligible for reelection under article 6 of the
Draft Statute. This is simply unacceptable. 281 One of the chief criticisms
278. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 71, cmt.
279. See, e.g., Siracusa Draft, supra note 17.
280. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Sessions Held from 11 to 21 February
1997, U.N. Doc A/AC.249/1997/L.S., Mar. 12, 1997. See also Preparatory Committee
Summary, First Session, supra note 9, at 9-10, 58-72 (revised definitions), 73-94 (Annex 11
on General Principles of Criminal Law).
281. The ILC has offered no tenable explanation of why the judges of the proposed
International Criminal Court, unlike the members of the International Court of Justice
or European Court of Justice, would not be eligible for reelection. Indeed the Commis-
sion's commentary on this point is extremely cryptic, stating only that "[t]he special
nature of an international criminal jurisdiction militates in favour of that principle [of
noneligibility for re-election]." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 51.
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of ad hoc tribunals is their inability to build up institutional memory and
competence. This can only be overcome by creating an independent, effec-
tive and competent judiciary. It must be possible for the judges of the
Court to acquire, to paraphrase Frederick Pollock, "a judicial habit of mind,
and the community of ideas that springs from regular common action ....
',282 Particularly if the Court functions only "intermittently," it is hard to
see any advantage that may come from disallowing the reelection of judges
who may have sat only during part of their first term. Indeed, this feature
of the Draft Statute may also make recruitment of high quality judges diffi-
cult, many of whom may have to leave prestigious situations to serve on the
Court. (The lack of remuneration of the judges will also be a factor in this
regard.)
It may be that the International Law Commission thought that judges
would be less tempted to structure their decisions along lines that would
maximize their reelection chances if they were simply not re-electable.
Thus, perhaps the drafters hoped to enhance at least the appearance, if not
the reality, of principled decisionmaking and thereby increase the accepta-
bility of the Court to the world public.283 At least one member of the Com-
mission has made this point, alluding to the politicization of the ICJ's
elections to emphasize the correctness of his position.28 4 The suggestion
appears to be that judges who cannot be reelected will be more independ-
ent on the bench because they will not be concerned with their reelection.
But this view is perhaps naive. Those judges will no doubt be worried
about the career they will have in their home state after their (short) tenure
is over, meaning that they will not be free from political pressure after all.
In any event, the problem of judicial independence is more appropriately
addressed not by forbidding judges to stand for more than one term, but by
offering them the protection that comes from deciding cases by consen-
sus.285 They are, in this way, insulated from the political process, at least
to some extent, and may feel freer to make difficult decisions without fear
of reprisal. This has certainly been a positive feature of the European
Court of Justice, 286 although it is not the model that was adopted for the
ICTY.
2. The Semi-Permanent Nature of the Court
Many have argued that semi-permanence was a necessary compromise to
achieve political backing for the proposed court. The United States govern-
ment has repeatedly expressed support for this feature of the Court, which
was the model adopted by the ILC's Working Group on an International
282. Frederick Pollock, The Work of the League of Nations, 35 L.Q. Rav. 193, 194
(1919).
283. I am indebted to Professor Stephen H. Legomsky for this point.
284. James Crawford, The Prospects for a Permanent International Criminal Court,
Remarks made on Saturday, October 19, 1996, at the University of Connecticut School
of Law, Conference on "Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy
of Nuremberg."
285. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
286. See Wexler, supra note 19.
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Criminal Court from the outset.28 7 Although it may make the Court
cheaper to operate, because judges and other staff will not be paid full-time
salaries unless the States Parties subsequently vote to change their status to
full-time, it is hard to see how this feature could improve the Court's func-
tioning. Given the current state of world affairs, the Court is likely to be
quite busy. If the Court is to meet the objections raised on the grounds of
deterrence, ability to enforce international law and the rule of law, it must
develop institutional competence. This goes for the prosecutorial staff as
well as the judiciary. The inclusion of this feature of the Court suggests a
lack of political will on behalf of States that may indeed be crippling to the
proposed institution.
3. The Role of the Court in Developing and Clarifying International
Criminal Law
It was originally proposed that the Court have a jurisdictional function like
the European Court of Justice's preliminary reference procedure, whereby
it could issue binding advisory opinions on international criminal law
referred to it by national court systems or by organs of the United Nations.
The idea was to permit the Court to assume a role of unifying and con-
structing international criminal law. As the Special Rapporteur stated in
his Ninth Report to the ILC:
The court could also play a very important role in the unification of interna-
tional criminal law .... It could help to remove some uncertainties regard-
ing terminology and the definition of concepts, such as complicity and
conspiracy and the attempt to commit such crimes, whose content varies
from one country to the next. It could also facilitate clarification of the
meaning and the content under international law of a number of principles,
such as the principles nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege or the
non bis in idem rule.288
This proposal was rejected by the ILC289 as too intrusive of state sover-
eignty. Granting the Court this kind of jurisdiction could have given the
Court the workload it needed to justify a "permanent" status, however, as
well as responded to objections about the undeveloped nature of interna-
tional criminal law. Its absence is understandable, but regrettable.
4. State Consent to Jurisdiction
The regime of State consent to jurisdiction is extremely problematic. First,
as outlined above, it will add considerable complexity to the prosecution of
offenses under the statute because indictments will often contain counts
alleging a variety of crimes. 290 Second, the opting-in regime will often per-
mit a State to block the prosecution of an offense even though other States
287. Commentators are divided on this point, however. See, e.g., ABA Task Force,
supra note 266, at 491 (Task Force was divided on this issue).
288. Ninth Thiam Report, supra note 114, cl 59.
289. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 70.
290. See, e.g., supra note 224-25 and accompanying text.
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would like prosecution to occur.29 1 Indeed, this provision may well have
the effect of completely gutting the Court's effectiveness, as noted by the
judges of the ICTY in their comments on the Draft Statute.292
One could take as an example the case of Dusko Tadic, the first
defendant tried before the ICTY in the Hague. Tadic is accused of crimes
he committed as a guard at the Omarska detention camp southeast of
Prijedor, Bosnia. He was arrested in Germany and the Prosecutor's office
of the ICTY asked for his transfer to the Tribunal, which was subsequently
effected. He was indicted for crimes against humanity (ICTY Statute, art.
5), Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (ICTY Statute, art.
2), and war crimes (ICTY Statute, art. 3).293 These allegations correspond
to articles 20(c) and 20(d) of the 1994 ILC Draft Statute. Under the cur-
rent regime of State consent, and assuming that the Security Council had
not referred the matter (which eliminates the regime of State consent),294
the complaint must be filed by a State that is not only a party to the Statute
but has accepted the Court's jurisdiction under article 22, presumably with
respect to both crimes. Germany, as the custodial state, would also be
required to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICC, again, presumably with
respect to both crimes. Finally, the "territorial state," that is, the State
upon whose territory the act occurred must consent to the Court's jurisdic-
tion. The question in this case might be which State-the former Yugosla-
291. The Commission suggests that it abandoned the "opting-out" system because
often it would not be obvious until after a complaint was filed, which States' consents
were required. This would mean that cases might not be heard even though all the
States concerned might be willing for the Court to take the case. 1994 Draft Statute,
supra note 7, art. 22, cmt.
292. Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/
53, U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an Intenational Criminal Court,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1 (1995) at 29. A brief review of the scholarship on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is equally illuminating. Most commentators have suggested that
the ICJ's most debilitating problems have arisen because of its system of compulsory
jurisdiction. Under the so-called "Optional Clause" (Article 36(2) of the ICJ's Statute) a
State may register unilateral declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction over future
disputes with the Court. The precise legal effect of these declarations is largely a matter
of state discretion, as most declarations include special provisions (either "conditions"
or "reservations") specifying effective duration, substantive scope, withdrawal mecha-
nisms, etc. A competitive logic is driving most states away from meaningful acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court now finds itself deluged by a
series of increasingly clever devices for seeming to submit to its jurisdiction while in no
sense actually doing so. The weakness of the Article 36(2) Optional Clause has proven
enormously damaging to the power and prestige of the ICJ. See J. Patrick Kelly, The
International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12 YALEJ. IN'TL L. 342 (1987);J.G.
Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 50 [1979] Brr. Y.B. l'rr'L L. 87; Shigeru Oda, Reser-
vations in the Declarations of Acceptance of the Optional Clause and the Period of Validity of
Those Declarations: The Effect of the Shultz Letter, 59 [1988] Bmr. Y.B. INTL L. 1. But see
James Crawford, The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court, 1979 Brr. Y.B. brr'L L. 63. A more positive view of the ICJ's jurisdiction
is provided by Roslyn Higgins (now a member of the Court), who points to increased
use of the ad hoc jurisdictional reference as a healthy trend away from over-preoccupa-
tion with jurisdictional issues. HIGGINS, supra note 255, at 191.
293. See The Prosecutor v. Dusan Tadic a/k/a! "Dule", International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, <gopher://gopher.igcapc .... 950213-Tadic-indictment>.
294. See Figure 4 supra.
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via or one or more of its current components? Presumably, if any of these
three States objected to the Court's jurisdiction either as to one or both of
the crimes,295 the Court could not hear the case. Thus, as noted earlier,296
unless the Security Council refers the matter to the Court, it is unlikely to
have very much to do.
5. The Relationship of the Court to the United Nations
The relationship is problematic for two principal reasons. First, as cur-
rently envisaged, the Security Council may block submission of matters to
the Court in cases being dealt with as a breach of the peace or act of aggres-
sion under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.297 Additionally, all
complaints based on an act of aggression must be preceded by a Security
Council determination of aggression.298 A political element is thus intro-
duced into the Court's operation which threatens to undermine its imparti-
ality and credibility. Second, the absence of a formal relationship with the
United Nations means the Court will need to be financed and supported in
some other way. Given the resources problems that have plagued the ICTY
and the ICTR, this is likely to be a significant impediment to the Court's
successful operation. These points will be taken up in reverse order.
Proponents of the International Criminal Court have, from the very
beginning, debated what the relationship of the Court and the United
Nations should be. It has generally been thought that the optimal solution
would be to establish the International Criminal Court as an United
Nations organ,299 in order to "ensure its universality, moral authority and
financial viability."300 The problem with this approach is that it would
require the Charter's amendment, which could involve considerable delay
and be extremely difficult, it not impossible.301 The consensus has gener-
ally been that the multilateral treaty approach avoids such difficulty. This
also means that funding will be on an ad-hoc basis, unless States Parties
295. Although it is not completely clear, the Statute does not appear to mean the
specific criminal allegations against Tadic, when it refers to "crimes," but rather that the
State in question has consented to jurisdiction over "a crime referred to in Article 20."
1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 21(1). That is, the Statute does not seem to permit
States to pick and choose between various criminal allegations, agreeing to jurisdiction
in the case of several murders, for example, but disagreeing in the case of rapes (both of
these would fall either under crimes against humanity, war crimes, or both, depending
on the context). Nevertheless, one can imagine a State wishing to do exactly that, and
bringing pressure to bear on the Prosecutor's office to have certain charges dropped in
exchange for a State's consent to jurisdiction. Such exchanges would undoubtedly
undermine the Court's prestige and effectiveness by calling into question the Prosecu-
tor's integrity.
296. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
297. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 23(3) cmt.
298. Id. art. 23(2).
299. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
300. UN Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3.
301. Some delegations at the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, however, stated that this
problem should not be "overemphasized" given the current discussions concerning the
restructuring of the Security Council. Id. at 3-4.
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are required to commit resources in advance.30 2 Indeed, despite the rela-
tively low cost of creating a court that could potentially "deter future occur-
rences of [serious international] crimes,"303 compared to the billions spent
on weapons used in perpetrating (and arguably preventing) such crimes,
the need to create an International Criminal Court that is not "costly" has
been a constant theme of the debate. There is little that can be done about
this problem, which could, of course derail all efforts in this regard.
The issue of the Security Council's involvement, however, is more sus-
ceptible to solution. The 1951 Committee draft permitted the General
Assembly to lodge complaints with the Court.304 The 1953 Draft removed
that power but would have permitted (as one alternative) a United nations
organ to stop proceedings in a particular case "in the interest of the mainte-
nance of peace."'30 5 The 1994 ILC Draft Statute essentially adopts this
solution, which appears completely inconsistent with the necessary inde-
pendence of the Court.30 6 It permits the Security Council both to file com-
plaints and block proceedings.30 7
Although it is understandable that the United Nations might be
empowered to refer matters to the Prosecutor so long as it has no power to
influence the outcome of those cases, it is not possible to maintain the
Court's independence if the Security Council, which is a political organ,
can stop proceedings because it is taking action under Chapter VII.3 0 8
Detailed discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article, but,
particularly if aggression is dropped as a crime from the International
Criminal Court's jurisdiction, as is likely, there is no reason to involve the
Security Council in otherwise independent judicial proceedings. This is
particularly so given the extremely serious nature of the offenses within the
Court's jurisdiction and the need for the Court to treat all parties before it
equally.30
9
302. It is essential that a financing plan be worked out in advance, given the poor
track records of States with respect to the ICTY. The United States Contribution to the
ICTY for 1996, for example has been $0. (It was $700,000 in 1995). Canada, on the
other hand, contributed US $171,000 in 1995 and US $ 268,000 in 1996.) International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Bulletin, N°9/10 14-VIII-1996, at 6.
303. UN Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 17, at 3.
304. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
306. The 1994 Draft Statute, however vests the power in the Security Council rather
than the General Assembly stating that the "General Assembly lack[s] authority under
the Charter to affect directly the rights of states against their will, especially in respect of
issues of criminal jurisdiction." 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 86.
307. Id. art. 23. At the same time, the comment suggests that "if the costs of proceed-
ings are to be met by states parties rather than through the United Nations system,
special provisions will need to be made to cover the costs of trials pursuant to Article
23(1)." Id. at 86.
308. There was extensive debate on this issue both by the Ad Hoc Committee and the
Preparatory Committee.
309. Many members of the Commission also felt this way, as reflected in the Com-
mentary to article 23. In particular, some members expressed concern that article 23
would introduce inequity between States Parties to the Statute, some of which would be
members of the Security Council, others not. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 88.
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6. Jurisdiction Rationae Materiae
Defining the Court's jurisdiction has been one of the most difficult obsta-
des in adopting a statute. As noted above, part of the problem is the some-
what diffuse nature of international criminal law. Another part of the
problem is that the Commission tried to draft a statute that would cover a
very wide variety of offenses in order to respond to the needs of States. The
Preparatory Committee Sessions and many NGOs have focussed on the
substantive jurisdiction of the Court and have proposed a variety of solu-
tions. Two trends emerge from these discussions, both of which can be
considered positive developments.
The first trend is the elimination of many of the treaty crimes which
are not international crimes but rather national offenses with international
effects. This would probably include drug trafficking, even though a case
can be made for its inclusion as an international crime.3 10 The problem
with the inclusion of treaty-based crimes, such as drug trafficking, is that
the expansion of the Court's jurisdiction to include crimes which are not
also considered crimes under customary international law substantially
complicates the application of the Statute. In addition, particularly with
respect to narcotics crimes, an argument can be made that these crimes
would overwhelm the Court, even if limited, as article 20(e) requires, to
conduct that "constitute[s] exceptionally serious crimes of international
concern." 3 11 Finally, while there is no doubt that many small nations find
themselves unable to effectively combat narcoterrorism, this is a case in
which the regime of interstate cooperation could prove effective, and in
which other larger nations, such as the United States, have a self-interest in
doing so. Thus, to include these crimes in the Statute may unnecessarily
complicate it and detract from what many perceive to be the Court's central
purpose, which is the prosecution of serious violations of international
humanitarian law.3 12
The other trouble spot is the crime of aggression. It is likely that this
crime will be dropped from any Court Statute finally adopted, which,
although disappointing,3 13 is probably inevitable. First, although the Gen-
eral Assembly defined aggression in 1974, it did so in a political rather
than a legal context. Thus, the definition is unsuitable in certain respects
for use by the Court. Obtaining a satisfactory definition is almost sure to
310. 1993 Draft Statute, supra note 122, at 110-11.
311. 1994 Draft Statute, supra note 7, art. 20(e).
312. A strong counterargument can be made, however, for the inclusion of treaty
crimes within the Court's statute. The International Law Association's Committee on a
Permanent International Criminal Court has suggested that several treaty crimes be
included within the Court's Statute, but that a special Chamber of the Court be estab-
lished to deal with them. This would encourage States desiring the inclusion of Treaty
Crimes to ratify the Court's Statute, but would avoid diminishing its moral strength by
having individuals on trial for relatively minor offenses at the same time that major war
criminals were being prosecuted. See I.L.A First Committee Report, supra note 2, q 8.
313. This is ironic given that the General Assembly cited the need to define the crime
of aggression as the rationale for dropping the International Criminal Court and Code of
Offenses project in the 1950s. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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pose an insurmountable obstacle to the Statute's adoption given the reluc-
tance of States to agree on this issue. Moreover, it is not clear how much is
really gained as a legal matter by the addition of the crime. Most of those
who would be guilty of aggression can probably be indicted on other
counts, such as genocide or serious violations of the law and customs gov-
erning armed conflicts. Although it would be preferable if the Court could
declare particular uses of force to be illegal, this will necessarily involve the
determination of political questions that could threaten the Court's very
existence. Finally, under the current proposal, the Security Council must
make a finding of aggression before the Court is permitted to pursue this
crime. This raises serious doubts about the Court's independence, doubts
which must be allayed if the Court is to function effectively and win the
loyalty and support of States. Conversely, if aggression is dropped from
the Statute, a case can be made that the right of the Security Council to
stop proceedings should be deleted, as there are essentially no "political"
questions left to decide. Thus, as others have suggested,314 it is probably
preferable to narrow the Court's jurisdiction to the core crimes represent-
ing serious violations of international humanitarian law, rather than try to
do too much at once.315
Conclusion
It nearly defies human understanding that after two world wars in this
century, millions of deaths, disappearances, and other human rights
abuses are still occurring. To imagine that an international criminal court
could put a stop to this human tragedy overnight is folly. To believe, how-
ever, that this tragedy is inherently unrestrainable by law and justice is
equally wrong. As Justice Jackson told the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg:
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization.
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal
with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of importance. It
does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does expect that your
juridical action will put the forces of International Law, its precepts, its
prohibitions and, most of all its sanctions, on the side of peace .... 316
314. See, e.g., LAwYERS ComurrrRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE DRAFt STATUTE 5 (1996).
315. The I.L.A. Committee on a Permanent International Criminal Court was split on
the issue of aggression. A majority of the Committee's membership felt that aggression
should be within the Court's jurisdiction, for failure to include it would mark a retreat
from the principles laid down by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
which considered aggression to be the "supreme" international crime. Moreover, the
possibility that the Court's establishment could deter criminal behavior could be seri-
ously weakened were aggression omitted, for those who started a conflict might be insu-
lated from punishment. It is certainly conceivable that, at least in democratic States, a
general or Chief of Staff may, in a particular case, feel that a particular military action
violates international law and raise objections before rather than after the fact. LL.A.
First Committee Report, supra note 2, '1 10.
316. JAcKSON, supra note 44, at 94.
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In its 1994 Draft Statute, the International Law Commission
attempted to produce a document that would be a compromise between
those who would have gone much further and those who felt that nothing
should be done at all. The Commission was thus in relative agreement
about the desirability of creating an international criminal court, but in
almost complete disarray as to the form such an institution would take.
This schizophrenia is reflected in the 1994 Draft Statute, which, as out-
lined above can be criticized in many respects. The 1994 Draft neverthe-
less provides a viable starting point for discussion, as the relatively positive
outcome of the two Preparatory Committee sessions thus far indicates. But
this is not enough. There are certain features of the proposed statute that
threaten to cripple the proposed Court from the outset. It is better to create
a strong institution with a narrow compulsory jurisdiction, as some NGOs
have argued,3 17 than to try to be all things to all States and end up with a
structure that cannot function at all.
Over the next year, the Preparatory Committee will continue its discus-
sions with a view to producing a draft text that can be the subject of a
diplomatic conference. The governments represented at those meetings
have a heavy burden to see that the hopes and aspirations of citizens who
suffer from international crime are not traded away in endless negotiations
on points of trivia and legal technicalities that, in the long run, are of little
import. They have a responsibility to establish an international criminal
court that can function as an impartial, independent and credible institu-
tion-puppet neither to the Security Council, the Superpowers, or the poli-
tics of States. Whether they have the courage to do so, of course, remains
to be seen.
317. See, e.g., LAwYERs CoMMrTr, supra note 314, at 5.
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